IN RE PETITION OF PACIFIC RY. COMMISSION.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

U. S. Circuit Court, .Di8t. of California.
IN iE PETITION OF THE PACIFIC RAILWAY COMMMISSION TO
COMPEL SENATOR LELAND STANFORD TO ANSWER CERTAIN QUESTIONS.
BEFo.E FiELD, SAWYER, HOFFMAN and SABIN, JJ.

The powers of the Commission fully stated, and the application
to compel the witness to answer denied.
The motion for a peremptory order for witness to answer interrogatories propounded by the Railway Commission has been fully
argued, and everything which could be said in its favor has been
ably presented by the United States attorney, either in oral or
printed arguments. In resisting the motion counsel of respondent
have not confined themselves to a discussion of the propriety and necessity of the interrogatories and the sufficiency of the answers given
by him, but they have assailed the validity of the act creating the
commission so far as it authorizes an examination into the private
affairs of directors, officers and employees of the Central Pacific
Railroad Company, and confers the right to invoke the power of
the federal courts in aid of the general investigation directed. Impressed with the gravity of the questions presented, we have given
to them all consideration in our power. The Pacific Railway Commission, created under Act of Congress of March 3, 1887, is not
a judicial body. It possesses no judicial power. It can determine
no right to the government of companies whose affairs it investigates. Those rights will remain the subject of judicial inquiry
and determination as fully as though the commission had never
been created, and in such inquiry its report to the president of its
action will not be even admissible as evidence of any matters investigated. It is a mere board of inquiry, directed to obtain information upon certain matters and report the result of its investigations
to the president, and also to lay the same before Congress. In
the progress of its investigations and in furtherance of them, it is
in terms authorized to invoke the aid of the courts of the United
States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of books, papers and documents, and the act provides that the Circuit or District Court of the United States within
the jurisdiction of which the contumacy or refusal of any person
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to obey q subpcena to him may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the commissioners, and produce books and
papers and give evidence touching the matters in question. Of all
the rights of the citizen few are of greater importance, or more
essential to his peace and happiness, than the right of personal
security, and that involves not merely protection of his person from
assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from
inspection and scrutiny of others. Without enjoyment of this right,
all other rights would lose half their value. The law provides for
the compulsory production in progress of judicial proceedings, or
by direct suit for that purpose, of such documents as affect the interest of others, and also in certain cases for the seizure of criminating papers necessary for the prosecution of offenders against
public justice, and only in one of these ways can they be obtained,
and their contents made known against the will of the owners. In
the recent case of Boyd v. The Uiited States, 116 U. S. 616, the
Supreme Court held that the provision of a law of Congress which
authorized a court of the United States in revenue cases on a motion
of a government attorney, to require defendant or claimant to produce in court his private books, invoices and papers, or that the
allegations of an attorney respecting them should be taken as confessed, was unconstitutional and void as applied to suits for penalties, or to establish forfeiture of the party's goods.
The court, speaking by Mr. Justice BRADLEY, said: "Any compulsory evidence discovered by extorting a party's oath or compelling the production of his. private books and papers to convict
him of crime or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles
of free government; it is abhorrent to the institutions of.an Englishman, and it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American ; it
may suit the purpose of despotic power, but it can not abide the
pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom." The
language thus used had reference, it is, true, to the compulsory
production of papers as the foundation for criminal proceedings,
but it is applicable to any such production of private books and
papers of a party otherwise than in the course of judicial proceedings or direct suit for that purpose. It is a forcible intrusion into
and compulsory exposure of one's private affairs and papers without
judicial process, or in the course of judicial proceedings, which is
abhorrent to
contrary to the principles of free government and is.
and
Americans.
Englishmen
the instincts of
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In'filbourne v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, we have the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, that neither house of
.Congress had power to make inquiries into the private affairs of a
citizen-that is, to compel the exposure of such affairs. That case
was the firm of Jay Cook & Co., who were debtors of the United
States, and it was alleged that they were interested in a "real estate
pool" in the city of Washington, and that the trustees of their
estate and effects had made a settlement of their interests with associates of the firm to the disadvantage and loss of numerous creditors, including the government of the United States. The House
of Representatives, by resolution, reciting these facts, authorized
the speaker to appoint a committee of five to inquire into the matter and the history of said real estate pool, and the character of
settlement, with the amount of property involved in which Jay
Cook & Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in
said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers and report
to the house. The committee was appointed and organized, and
proceeded to make the inquiry directed. A subpcena was issued
to one Kilbourn, commanding him to appear before the committee
to testify and be examined touching the matters to be inquired into,
and to bring with him certain designated records, papers and maps
relating to the inquiry. Kilbourn appeared before the committee,
and was asked to state the names of the five members of the real
estate pool and where each resided, and he refused to answer the
questions or to produce the books which had been required. The
committee reported the matter to the house, and it ordered the
speaker to issue his warrant directing the sergeant-at-arms to arrest
Kilbourn, and bring him before the bar of the House to answer
why he should not be punished for contempt.
On being brought before the House, Kilbourn persisted in his
refusal to answer the question and to produce the books and papers
required. He was thereupon held to be in contempt, and committed to the custody of the sergeant-at-arms until he should signify
his willingness to appear before the committee and answer questions
and obey the subpcena duces tecum, and it was ordered that in the
meantime the sergeant-at-arms should cause him to be confined in
the common jail of the District of Columbia. He was accordingly
confined in that jail for forty-five days, when he was released on
habeas corpus by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia. Upon his release he sued the speaker of
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the House, members of the committee and sergeant-at-arms for his
forcible arrest and confinement. Defendants pleaded the facts recited, to which pleas plaintiff demurred. The demurrer was overruled and judgment was affirmed as to all the defendants except the
sergeant-at-arms. They being members of the House were held to
be protected from prosecution for their action, but as to Thompson
judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. In the Supreme Court the case received great consideration, and it was held that the subject-matter of investigation was
judicial and not legislative, and there was no power in Congress or
in either house on allegation that an insolvent debtor of the United
States was interested in a private business partnership, to investigate the affairs of that partnership, and consequently no authority
to compel witness to testify on the subject. "The House of Representatives," said the court, "has the sole right to impeach officers of the government and the Senate to try them. Were the
question of such impeachment before either body acting in its appropriate sphere on that subject, we see no reason to doubt the
right to compel the attendance of witnesses and their answer to
proper questions in the same manner and by the use of the same
means that courts of justice chn, in like cases. Whether the power
of punishment in either house by fine or imprisonment goes beyond
this or not, we are sure that no person ca-A be punished for contumacy as a witness before either house unless his testimony is required
in a matter in which that house has jurisdiction to inquire, and we
feel equally sure that neither of these bodies possesses the general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of a citizen. And
again, if the investigation which the committee was directed to
make was judicial in its character, and could only be properly and
successfully made by a court of justice, and if it related to a matter
wherein relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceedings,
we do not, after what has been said, deem it necessary to discuss
the proposition that the power attempted to be excercised was one
confided by the constitution to the judicial and not the legislative
department of the government. We think it equally clear that the
power asserted is judicial and not legislative." And again, "the
resolution adopted as a sequence of the preamble contains no hint
of any intention of final action by Congress on the subject. In all
argument on the case, no suggestion has been made of what the
House of Representatives or Congress could have done in the way
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of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cook & Co.,
or even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affairs of individuals ? If so, the House
of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more
than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could result
in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referred."
When the case went back to the Supreme Court of the District.
of Columbia and was tried, plaintiff recovered a verdict of $100,000
against the sergeant-at-arms. This amount was subsequently reduced to.$25,000, which was paid by order of Congress. This case
will stand for all time as a bulwark against the invasion of the right
of a citizen to protection in his private affairs against unlimited
scrutiny of investigation by a congressional committee. Courts are
open to the United States as they are to a private citizen, and both
can there secure, by regular proceedings, ample protection of all
rights and interests which are entitled to protection under the government of a written constitution and laws. The Act of Congress
not only authorizes a searching investigation into the methods,
affairs and business of the Central Pacific Railroad, but it makes
it the duty of the railroad commssioners to inquire into, to ascertain, and report whether any of the directors, officers or employees
of that company have been or are now, directly or indirectly, interested, and to what amount or extent, in any other railroad, steamship, telegraph, express, mining, construction, or other business
company or corporation, and with which any agreement, undertakings or leases have been made or entered into. There are over
one hundred officers, principal and minor, of the Central Pacific
Railroad Company, and nearly five thousand employees. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that a large portion of these havb some
interest as stockholders or otherwise in some other company or
'corporation with which the railway company may have an agreement of some kind, and it would be difficult to state the extent to
which the explorations of the commission in the private affairs of
these persons may not go if the mandates of the act could be fully
carried out; but, in accordance with the principles declared in the
case of Kilbourn v. kompson, and equally important doctrines
announced in Boyd v. The United States, the commission is limited
in its inquiries into the interest of these directors, officers and employees in any other business, company or corporation to su6h matVOL. XXXV.-79
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ters as these persons may choose to disclose. They can not be
compelled to open their books and expose such other business to
the inspection and examination of the commission. They were
not prohibited from engaging in any other lawful business, because
of their interests in and connection with the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and that other business might as well be the construction and management of other railroads as the planting of
vines or raising of fruit in which some of these directors and officers and employees have been in fact engaged, and they are entitled
to the same protection and exemption from inquisitorial investigation into such business as any other citizens engaged in like business. With reference to vouchers respecting which the principal
interrogatories are propounded, and to which we are asked to compel answers from witness, it is conceded by the commissioners on
this motion that moneys covered by them were not charged against
the United States in ascertaining the net earnings of the company.
If such were the case, it is difficult to see what interest the United
States can have in the disposition of these moneys. Be that as it
may, the general courrs can not upon that concession aid the commission in ascertaining how moneys were expended, and these courts
can not become the instrument of the commission in furthering its
investigation. The Act of Congress creating the railroad commission in terms provides, as already stated, that it may invoke the
aid of any circuit or district court to require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of books, papers and documents relating to the subject of the inquiry, and empowers a court on contumacy or the refusal of persons to obey subpoenas to them, to issue
orders requiring them to appear before the commissioners or either
of them, and produce the books and papers ordered and give evidence touching matters on question and to punish disobedience to
its orders, and does not appear to leave any discretion in the matter
with the court. It would appear as though Congress intended that
the court should make the order sought upon the mere request of
the commissioners without regard to the nature of the inquiry. It
is difficult to believe that it, could have intended that the court
should be thus a mere executor of the commissioners' will, and yet,
if the commissioners are not bound, as they have asserted, by any
rules of evidence in their investigation, and may receive hearsay
ex parte statements and information of every character that may be
brought to their attention, and the court is to aid them in this
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matter of investigation, there can be no room for the exercise of
judgment as to the propriety of the questions asked, and the court
is left merely to direct that the pleasure of the commissioners in
the line of their inquiries be carried out. But if it was expected
that the court, when its aid is invoked, should examine the subject
of the inquiries to see their character so as to be able to determine
the propriety and pertinency of questions and the propriety and
necessity of producing the books, papers and documents asked for
before the commissioners, then it would be called upon to exercise
advisory functions in an administrative or political proceeding or
exercise of judicial power. If the former theory can not be invested
in the court, if the latter power can only be exercised in cases or
controversies enumerated in the Constitution, or in case of habeas
corpus, the provision of the act authorizing courts to aid in the investigation in the manner indicated must therefore be adjudged
void. The Federal courts under the constitution can not be made
aids to any investigation by commission or committee into the
affairs of any one. If rights are to be protected or wrongs redressed by any investigation, it must be conducted by regular proceedings in courts of justice in cases authorized by the constitution.
Inability of courts of the United States to exercise power in any
other than regular judicial proceedings was decided in RIayburn's
case as early as 1792 (2 Dall. 409). The conclusion we have thus
reached disposes of the petition of the railroad commissioners, and
renders it unnecessary to consider whether the interrogatories propounded were proper in themselves or were sufficiently met by the
answers given by Stanford, or whether any of them were open to
objection for the assumptions they made, or the imputations they
applied. It is enough that the federal courts can not be made instruments to aid the commissioners in their investigations, *and it
also renders it unnecessary to make any comment upon the extraordinary position taken by them. According to the statement of
respondent, to which we have referred, they did not regard themselves bound in their examination by ordinary rules of evidence,
but would receive hearsay and ex parte statements, surmises, and
information of every character that might be called to their attention. It can not be that courts of the United States can be used
in furtherance of investigations in which all rules of evidence may
be thus disregarded. The motion of the district attorney for a
peremptory order upon witness to answer interrogatories propounded
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as set forth in the petition of the railrad commissioners, is therefore
denied.
We have read the above case with
more than ordinary interest, both on account of its own importance and on account of adverse criticism in the daily
press. A careful examination of the
case convinces us that it is entirely correct and well sustained, both by reason
and precedent; indeed, we do not see
how a decision to the contrary could possibly have been arrived at. The reasoning of the court on the subject is so
conclusive that little need be added to it.
The power to punish for contempt is
generally an incident to the exercise of
judicial power, and exercisable only
where the tribunal has jurisdiction both
of the person and the subject-matter.
Although American legislative bodies
have not been clothed with the judicial
function, and, therefore, do not possess
general power to punish for contempt,
yet, incidental to their legislative authoricy, they may punish as contempts those
acts of members and others which tend
to obstruct the performance of legislative
duty, or to defeat, impede, or embarrass
the exercise of legislative powers : Cooley's Const. Limi., 134 ; but only where
it has jurirdiction of the subject-matter,
that is to say, where the subject-matter
is legislation, or one of the few cases in
which the legislature may exercise judicial or quasi judicial power, of which it
is clear that the principal caso is not one.
The question as to what is a judicial
power has frequently been before the
courts for determination. Says Judge
Cooany : "to adjudicate upon and
protect the rights and interests of individuals, and to that end to construe and
apply the laws, is the peculiar province
of the judicial department :" Cooley's
Const. Lim., 91. " ' Powers judicial,'
'judiciary powers' and 'judicatories,'
are all phrases used in the constitution ;
and though not particularly defined, are
still so used to designate with clearness

that department of government which it
was intended should interpret and administer the laws. On general principles, therefore, those inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are
peculiar to such a department, must in
their nature be judicial acts, nor can
they be both judicial and legislative,
because a marked difference exists between the employments of judicial and
legislative tribunals ; the former decide
upon the legality of claims and conduct,
and the latter make rules upon which, in
connection with the constitution, those
decisions should be founded. It is the
province of judges to determine what is
the law upon existing cases. In fine, the
law is applied by the one and made by
the other. To do the first, therefore, to
compare the claims of parties with the
law of the land before established, is,
in its nature, a judicial act ; but to do
the last, to pass new rules for the regulation of new controversies, is, in its
nature, a legislative act; and if these
rules interfere with the past or the present and do not look wholly to the future,
they violate the definition of the law ' as
a rule of civil conduct,' because no rule
of conduct can, with consistency, operate
upon what occurred before the rule itself
was promulgated. It is the province of
judicial power also to decide private
disputes between or concerning persons,
but of legislative power to regulate public concerns and to make laws for the
benefit and welfare of the state :" Merrill
v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199, 203. Per
WOODBURt, J.
In the case of Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 24 Am. L. Reg.(N. S.), 790, the
subject of judicial power is considered
by CAmPBELL, J. ; and in the note to

that case we had occasion to consider the
subject to some extent. The tendency
of the legislatures to confuse all of the
distinctions between legislative and ju-
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dicial powers, and to usurp the powers
confided by the constitution to the courts
-to say nothing of the violation of the
rights of personal security and private
property therein involved-makes the
principal- case a salutary one. Without
expressing any opinion as to the merits
of the particular point in controversy, it
is enough to know that the act in question is a violation of the right to personal security, and confuses the distinctions made by the constitution between
legislative and judicial authority. It is
clear that the act contemplates that the
court should either be the mere executor
of the commissioners' will or should exercise advisory functions in an administrative or political proceeding, or in the
exercise of judicial power. Clearly the
former duty cannot be imposed upon the
court, and the latter only in cases enumerated in the constitution. As stated
by the court, " The federal courts, tnder
the constitution, cannot be made aids to
any investigation by commission or committee, into the affairs of any one. If
rights are to be protected or wrongs re-

dressed by any investigation, it must be
conducted by regular proceedings in
courts of justice in cases authorized by
the constitution." The remedy for the
wrong sought to be redressed by Congress in the act in question, must, under
the constitution, be sought in the regular
way, by appeal to a court of competent
jurisdiction, proceeding according to the
course of the common law or of chancery.
The cases of Stockdale v. .Hanssard,9
Ad. & El. 1; Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U. S. 168; Boyd v. The United
States, 116 Id. 616 ; Lloyd v. Wayne
Circuit Judge, 24 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)
790 ; and the reasoning of the court in
the principal case, would seem, to the
mind of an impartial reader, entirely
conclusive upon the question in issue;
and it is to be hoped that they will prove
a warning to future legislatures that the
distinctions between judicial and legislative power cannot be broken down at
will, and the constitutional rights of the
citizen infringed with impunity.
M. D. EwELL.

Chicago.

Supreme Court of Montana.
KELLEY v. CABLE CO.
Where, on the trial of an action brought by an employee against his employer for
damages for personal injuries, the only instruction given on the question of-ordinary
care and reasonable care or diligence was one asked for by the plaintiff, he cannot
be heard to complain on appeal that the jury were not sufficiently instructed on that
point.
It is error to give to the jury conflicting instructions based upon different views
of the law applicable to the case, without such instructions being harmonized by
the judge.
In an action for damages brought by an employee against his employer, an instruction to the effect that if the employer employed, as fellow-servants with the
employee, men of usual competency and prudence in their business, then defendant
is not liable for their negligence, and the law does not require the defendant or his
foreman to personally supervise such men, but that he has a right to rely upon their
discharging their duties with proper care, is misleading, as suggesting that the employer might be justified in neglecting his duties of supervision.
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Where, in such case, it is admitted, in an instruction asked by plaintiff, that the
plaintiff is without fault or negligence on his part, it is error to admit an-instruction
asked for by defendant oi the question of contributory negligence.
Where, in such an action, the defendant admits that it was the duty of the foreman
to see that certain blasting charges had been removed, and to warn plaintiff if they
had not, it is error to instruct the jury that it was the duty of plaintiff's co-employees to remove the charges, and that if the foreman undertook to do this, he acted
as a fellow-servant of the plaintiff in doing it, and the defendant, therefore, was not
responsible for his negligence in the matter.

from District Court, Deer Lodge county.
Action to recover damages for personal injuries.
states the facts.
APPEAL

The opinion

William Scallon and . W. Cole, for appellant.
Biram Knowles amd W. W. Dixon, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
M LEARY, J.-The plaintiff, William Kelley, brought this action
against the defendant, the Cable Company, to recover damages in
the sum of '30,000 for personal injuries sustained by him while
working as a carman in the defendant's mine. There was a trial
by jury, and a verdict for the defendant, and, after motion for a new
trial overruled, the plaintiff appeals to this court from the judgment
and from the order overruling the motion for a new trial. The following facts were admitted by the defendant, as appears from the
record herein, to wit: That, at the time stated in the complaint,
the defendant was a corporation duly incorporated, and that it was
working and managing the mining of the Cable mine in Deer Lodge
county, Montana ; that on or about the nineteenth day of July 1884,
the plaintiff was employed by defendant, and in its service in said
mine, as a common laborer, removing ores and dirt, filling the cars
with the same, and runing such cars, and that the plaintiff was then
and there at work in said mine; and that the plaintiff, at the said
time, was ordered by the defendant's foreman, then and there in
charge of said mine, and under whose direction and control the
plaintiff was bound to work, to go to work in a certain cross-cut
in said mine at the work aforesaid; and that the plaintiff, in obedience to such orders, went to work as ordered to do, and while at
work therein that he was injured by an explosion ; and that said
explosion occurred and that plaintiff was injured, without any fault
on his part; and that, previous to the explosion, the plaintiff did
not know, and had no means of knowing whether or not there were
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at said place charges not shot off, and could not have discovered the
fact except by being informed thereof.
It appears from the evidence found in the record, that it was the
plaintiff's duty to shovel and load into the cars, within the time,
the rock and debris blasted by the miners, and to transport the same
to the mill and the dump; and further, that the plaintiff worked on
the night shift, and the miners who did the blasting worked on the
day shift-the plaintiff and others being required to remove, during the night, the ores, etc., which the miners had broken down
and blasted during the day ; and further, that while the plaintiff
was at work during the night of the 19th of July 1884, an explosion occurred in the cross-cut where he was working, which resulted
in the plaintiff's receiving very severe injuries, both .of his eyes
being blown out, and one ear being blown off, his head, face, and
neck and chest lacerated, thereby entirely destroying his sight
and the hearing of one ear, causing him great and excruciating
pain, and confining him to the hospital for several months, and rendering him forever incapable of working at his occupation. The
record further discloses the following: That the plaintiff, under
orders, went to work at 7 o'clock P. mi., one hour after the miners
on the day-shift had quit work. The blast had been fired at about
5 o'clock in the afternoon. In accordance with directions, the
plaintiff was working at the cross-cut, where he had been working
the night before; during the night, between 11 *and 2 o'clock,
while he was loosening rock and debris with his pick, the explosion
took place, and he was hurled eight or ten feet against a car,
and was rendered senseless for some time, and injured, as already
stated. No warning had been given the plaintiff of any danger existing in the place where he was sent to work, from a "missed
charge," or otherwise. On previous occasions he had been warned
by the foreman to look out for "missed charges." The foreman,
under instructions from the superintendent, had always made it his
business to examine, in order to ascertain whether or not all the
charges in the blasts had been fired, and when any had missed had
been particularly careful to warn the plaintiff and others to look out
for these missed charges.
It is a disputed question whether the explosion was caused by a
charge of powder left in a hole unexploded, or by a piece of loose
powder which had been accidentally dropped or otherwise misplaced among the rocks and debris. In one view of the evidence,
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it is possible that the jury may have regarded these injuries as the
result of an unavoidable accident, arising from causes over which
the defendant bad no control, or from dangers which the defendant
did not know of, and by the use of reasonable diligence could not
have ascertained; and for that reason we do not feel disposed to say
that this verdict was contrary to the evidence, or to disturb the
judgment on that ground. On this question we are not required
to express an opinion.
The admissions of the defendant entirely eliminate all questions
of contributory negligence from this case. The defence is based on
the theory that the explosion was an unavoidable accident, which
could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the Cable company, or
else was the result of the negligence of some one of the miners, fellowservants of the plaintiff, or of the foreman while acting in the
capacity of a miner and fellow-servant of the plaintiff. The evidence does not bear out the defence that the explosion was caused
by the negligence of a fellow-servant. If it was caused by negligence at all, it was the negligence of the foreman, in his capacity
as such, and was thus the negligence of the company whom: he
represented.
We are not called upon to review the instructions given by the
court at the request of the plaintiff. If any one of them is erroneous, the appellant is not in a position to complain. But on a
casual examination, as modified by the court, and given, they
seem to embody the law of the case, and appear to have been correctly given.
Nor can the appellant complain of the fact that "the charge of
the court nowhere defines or explains what is ordinary care, and
reasonable care or diligence, or the want of it." The only charge
given on the subject was asked by the appellant, and he cannot
complain of its insufficiency; but if he desired a correct definition
given, of the terms referred to, he should have requested an instruce
tion setting out such a definition.
It was not error in the court to modify instruction No. 16, asked
by the plaintiff, so as to limit defendant's duty to " ordinary care
and diligence," instead of "proper care and diligence," as stated
in the instruction. It is true that the court might well have instructed the jury more fully in regard to ordinary care and diligence, and doubtless would have done so had it been so requested.
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We believe what was said by this court in a case decided at the last
term is applicable to the facts of this case, and it may be quoted in
this connection. Mr. Chief Justice WADE, in delivering the opinion
of this court, in speaking of "ordinary care," uses the following
language : "But this term is relative; and ordinary and reasonable care, which is after all the most that the law requires, means,
when used in this connection, that degree of care which prudent
men, skilled in the particular business, would be likely to exercise
under the circumstances. The care must be proportionate to the
danger. What is ordinary care in a case of extraordinary danger
would be extraordinary care in a case of ordinary danger, and what
would be ordinary care in a case of little danger would be much
below this in case of great langer :" Diamond v. Northern -Pac.
Bd. Co., 6 Mont. 590; 13 Pac. Rep. 367.
The principal question presented by this appeal is whether the
court erred in giving to the jury the instructions asked by the defendant, to which the plaintiff excepted. The instructions generally
asked by the defendant, and given, are in many particulars contradictory to those given at the request of the plaintiff, and in this
particular are erroneous. Conflicting instructions must nearly
always mislead the jury, and are always good ground for reversal
where they have done so. The instructions asked by the different
parties to an action generally proceed upon entirely different theories of the law applicable to the case, and they should be so modified and harmonized as to present the law in its proper light, or
altogether disregarded, and the case given to the jury on the general
charge of the court alone.
The plaintiff in his complaint charges the defendant on account
of negligence alleged to have been committed through the acts of
the foreman and other agents, and the instructions given at his
request proceed upon that theory; but the instructions given at the
request of the defendant exclude altogether the idea of the defendant's liability for the negligence of any other agent than the foreman himself. The instructions asked by the plaintiff virtually
exclude the defence of the negligence of a fellow-servant from the
consideration of the jury; and this view of the matters at issue
seem to be borne out by the evidence. Still the instructions asked
by the defendant, and given, repeatedly present the acts of a fellowservant as a perfect defence to the plaintiff's case. Of course, if
the evidence warranted it, the defendant should have been given
VOL.
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the benefit of charges of this character; but then the plaintiff's
instructions should have been modified accordingly.
The twelfth instruction asked by the defendant reads as follows,
to wit : "If the defendant in this case employed as fellow-servants
with the plaintiff men of usual prudence and competency in their
business (and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the men defendant employed were such men), then defendant was not liable to plaintiff for the negligence of such fellowservants, and the law did not require that defendant or its foreman
should personally supervise such men, or see that everything they
did was carefully or properly done ; but defendant had a right to
rely upon the expectation that such men would discharge their duties with proper care and prudence, in a skilful manner." Even
if the evidence warranted the defence of the negligence being that
of a fellow-servant being submitted to the jury, this circumstance
stops short of what should have been given to the jury in that connection. The employment of skilful, prudent and sober men discharges the master from any responsibility for injuries caused by
their neglect to their fellow-servant; but the master does not have
the right, after employing such men, to impose upon them his own
duties, and, without supervising them in any way, impute to their
negligence any injuries his other servants may sustain, and thus
escape responsibility. But such might reasonably be inferred from
the charge. It seems that this instructioh might readily have misled
the jury to the prejudice of the appellant.
Instruction No. 10, given at the request of the defendant, presents as a defence the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. As
we understand this case, it was admitted by the defendant that the
plaintiff was injured without any fault or negligence on his part.
At least it is so stated in the eighth instruction asked by the plaintiff, and given ; and, even if it were not so admitted, these two
charges could not stand together, as they are contradictory; and to
give them both was certainly erroneous.
The fourteenth instruction given at the request of the defendant
reads as follows : "If the jury find from the evidence that it was
the duty of those who were engaged in blasting at the defendant's
mine, and that it is usually the duty of those engaged as laborers
in blasting in mines, to determine whether the blasts put in by them
have exploded, and that none of them have missed, then, if the
foreman undertook to perform this duty, he was a fellow-servant of
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the plaintiff as to this matter, in determining whether these blasts
had exploded, and none of them had missed, and the defendant was
not responsible for any negligence he may have been guilty of in
this matter." This instruction is not warranted by the evidence,
even if it stated the law correctly. But Savery, the superintendent,
and Showers, the foreman, testified that it was the duty of Showers, as foreman, to be particularly careful to see that all the blasts
had exploded, and to warn the plaintiff of any missed charges. If
the defendant, or its foreman, knew, or by the use of reasonable
diligence might have known, of the existence. of the danger from
this unexploded blast, it was his bounden duty to convey such information to the plaintiff: Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 190-193;
Spelman v. Pisher Iron Co., 56 Barb. 165. These are some of
the most familiar principles of law on which this case should have
been tried and presented to the jury in the court below. We cannot resist the conclusion that the plaintiff has been prejudiced by
the manner in which this case went to the jury; and the importance
of the case demands the utmost care in the application of the legal
principles by which it should be governed.
For the reason that the instructions given at the request of the
plaintiff 'are inconsistent with those, or some of those, given at the
request of the defendant, are not supported by the evidence, nor
declaratory of the law applicable to this case, the judgment and
order overruling the motion for a new trial are reversed, and the
cause remitted to be tried again.
The eases are very numerous in which
actions have been brought by servants
against their master to recover for injuries suffered by them in the course of
their employment, and while the general
principles governing the liability of
masters in such cases may be well known,
it is certainly worth while to consider the
subject in respect of certain interesting
questions which have arisen in relation
thereto. What duty does a master owe
to his servant ?
I. Duty of the Master in the Selection
of Fellow-Servants.-The master owes to
his servants the duty of exercising due
care in the selection of their fellow-servants. It is a general principle of the
law that a servant in entering into an
employment assumes all the usual and

ordinary risks incident to that employment. In the application of this principle, it has been held that a servant can
not recover from his master for injuries
occasioned by the negligence of a fellowservant while engaged in.the same common employment. This was so decided
in 1842, in Farwell v. Boston, 4&c., Rd.,
4 Met. (Mass.) 49, which is the leading
case on the subject, being followed by a
long line of decisions in the courts of this
conutry and of England. Inasmuch as
tha servant assumes this risk of injury,
happening through the negligence of his
fellow-servants, it is clearly the duty of
the master to exercise due care in the
selection of co-servants, or he will be
liable to one who is injured in consequence of such neglect. See McDonald
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v. Eagle, 6-c., Manuf. Co., 68 Ga.
839 (1882) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Roney,
89 Ind. 453 (1883) ; Indiana Mfg. Co.
v. Millican, 87 Id. 87 (1882) : Indianapolis, 6-c., Ry. v. Johnson, 102 Id. 352
(1885); Bogard v. Louisville,. 6-c., Rd.,
100 Id. 491 (1884) ; Hilts v. Chicago,
6-c.,
Rd., 55 Mich. 437 (1885).
The degree of care required in the
selection of servants is that which men
of ordinary care and prudence exercise.
The degree of care required, depends on
the nature of the employment. What
would be ordinary care and prudence in
one case, where the risk and hazard was
slight, might be gross negligence in
another case where the hazard and responsibility was greater. Hence, regard
must always be had to the nature of the
employment, in determining whether the
master has exercised due care in the
selection of his servants : Iichigan Cent.
Rd. v. Gilbert, 46 Mlich. 176 (1881).
In Wabash Ry. v. McDaniels, 107 U.
S. 454 (1882), it is laid down that what
is due care in the selection of servants,
depends on the exigency of the particular
service, and is such care as in view of
the consequences that may result from
negligence on the part of employees is
fairly commensurate with the perils or
dangers likely to be encountered. And
see Hdts v. Chicago, 4-c., Rd., supra.
In Turner v. City of Indianapolis, 96
Ind. 51, 56 (1884), the opinion is expressed that the rule applicable to private
corporations, such as railroads, &c., that
the master is not liable for injuries caused
by the negligence of a co-servant, cannot be applied to officers and agents
of municipal corporations, and that if in
any case the rule can be made applicable
to such officers and agents, that it cannot
be made to apply when they are acting
in entirely different departments of the
municipal government.
(a.) If a servant is injured by the
negligence of an incompetent co-servant,
the master will not be liable provided the
injured servant knew of the incompetency

of the fellow-servant and thereafter continued in the employment: Stafford v.
Chicago, &-c., Rd., 114 Ill. 244 (1885);
Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107 Id.
•44 (1883) ; Lake Shore, 4-c., Ry. v.
Stupak, 108 Ind. 1 (1886).
(b) In United States Rolling Stock
Co. v. Wilder, 116 Ill.
100 (1886), the
principle is declared that one entering
service is not bound to investigate and
find out at his peril whether the common
master has exercised proper care in the
selection of those already employed in
the same branch of the business, but that
he has a right to assume that this duty
has been discharged until notice to the
contrary has been brought home to him.
"All that the law demands of one thus
employed is, that he keep his eyes open
to what is passing before him and avail
himself of such information as he may
receive with respect to the habits and
characteristics of his fellow-servants,
and if, from either of these sources of information, he finds one of them, from
incompetency or other cause, renders his
own position extra hazardous, it is his
duty to notify the master, and if the latter
refuses to discharge the incompetent or
otherwise unfit fellow-servant, the complaining servant will have no alternative
but to quit the master's employ. If he
does not, he will be deemed to have
assumed the extra hazard of his position
thus occasioned."
(c.)The definition of fellow-servants
is a question of law, but it is always a
question of fact to be determined by the
jury from the evidence, whether the particular case falls within the definition:
Chicago, 6-c., Rd. v. Moranda, 108 Ill.
576, 581 (1884) ; Indianapolis, 4c.,
Rd.
v. Morgenstern, 106 Id. 216 (1883).
(d.)The Supreme Court of Illinois
thus defines fellow-servants : "In order
to constitute servants of the same master
Ifellow-servants,' within the rule respondeat superior, it is not enough they
are engaged in doing parts of some work,
or in the promotion of some enterprise
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carried on by the master, not requiring
co-operation, nor bringing the servants
together or into such personal relations
that they can exercise an influence upon
each other, promotive of proper caution
in respect of their mutual safety, but it
is essential that they shall be, at the time
of the injury, directly co-operating with
each other in the particular business in
hand, or that their usual duties shall
bring them into habitual consociation, so
that they may exercise an influence upon
each other, promotive of proper caution."
Indianapolis,6-c. Rd. v. Morgenstern, 106
Ill.
216 (1883) ; Chicago, &c., Rd., v.
Moranda, 108 Id. 576 (1884).
In Smith v. Oxford Iron Co., 42 N.
J. L. 468 (1880), it is said that to constitute persons fellow-servants, they need
not be engaged in the same place or in the
same particular work, but that it is sufficient if they are in the service of the same
master, engaged in the same common
work and acting for the accomplishment
of the same common purpose. That to
exempt the master, the servant to whose
xegligence the injury is to be attributed,
need not be on a parity of service with
the party injured, nor he engaged in the
same particular work.
In McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N. J.L.
120 (1876), a fellow-servant is said to
be any one who serves and is controlled
by the same master. That common employment is service of such kind that, in
the exercise of ordinary sagacity, all who
engage in it may be able to foresee, when
accepting it, that through the negligence
of fellow-servants, it may probably expose them to injury.
For instances of recent cases where
persons have been held not to be fellowservants, see Burlington, 4-c., Rd. v.
Crockett, 19 Neb. 138 (1886) ; Smith v.
S. C. & P. Rd., 15 Id. 585 (1884);
Madden v. Railroad Co., 28 W. Va. 610
(1886); St. Louis, 6-c., Rd. v. Weaver,
35 Kans. 412 (1886) ; Zicago, 4-c.,
Rd.
v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377 (1884) ; Mann
v. Oriental Print Works, 11 R. I. 152

(1875); McDonald v. Eagle, 4-c., Mfg.
Co., 68 Ga. 839 (1882).
I. Duty of the Mfaster as to Machinery
and Appliances.-The master is not an
insurer of the lives of his servants, and
does not engage that the machinery and
appliances which he puts into their hands
for the performance of the work shall be
absolutely safe and free from defects:
St. Louis, 1-c., Rd. v. Wqaver, 35 Kans.
412 (1886) ; Murphy v. Crossan, 98
Penn. St. 495 (1881); Green, 4-c., Pass.
Ry: v. Bresmer, 97 Penn. St. 103
(1881).
He does not owe them the duty of furnishing the newest and best machinery
which can be obtained: Philadelphia,
4,c., Rdi v. Keenan, 103 Pa. St. 124
(1883) ; Payne v. Rcese, 100 Id. 301
(1882) ; Marsh v. Chickering, 101 N.
Y. 396 (1886) ; Burns v. Chicago, 6-c.,
Rd., 69 Iowa 450 (1886) ; Berns v.
Coal Co., 27 W. Va. 285 (1885); Schall
v. Cole, 107 Pa. St. 1 (1884) ; Michigan Cent. Rd. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212
(1881). Buthe does owethem the duty
of exercising ieasonable care in providing machinery and appliances that are
suitable and reasonably safe. It is his
duty to furnish his servants such appliances as can, with reasonable care, be
used by them without danger: Berns v.
Coal Co., supra; Pittsburgh, 4-c., Rd.v.
Sentmeyer, 92 Pa. St. 276 (1879); Nordyke, 4-c., Co. v. Fan Sant, 99 Ind. 188
(1884) ; Gatesv. Southern MBinnesota Rd:
28 Minn. 110 (1881) ; Fay v: Minneapolis, 4-c., Rd., 30 Id. 231 (1883) ; and
the servant has a right to rely on the
safety and sufficiency of the appliances
provided for the accomplishment of the
work, unless their defectiveness is so apparent as to be open to the observation
of prudent men : Bradbury v. Goodwin,
108 Ind. 286 (1886).
In Stringham v. Stewart, 100 N. Y.
516 (1885), it is decided that where the
master has furnished a dangerous and
defective machine, he is not excused from
liability for an injury to his servant
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which would not have happened had the
machine been safe and suitable, by the
fact that the negligence of a fellow-servant co-operated in producing the injury.
This duty of a master to furnish safe
machinery and appliances makes it obligatory on a railroad company to exercise
due care and diligence in seeing that the
cars of other companies, which it allows
to come into its yards and be handled by
its employees, are reasonably safe to be
so handled, and it has been held that the
company cannot divest itself of this duty
to its servants for their safety and protection by a contract with such other
companies whose cars are used that the
latter shall keep them in repair: Chicago,
4-c., Rd. v. Avery, 109 Ill. 314 (1884).
A railroad company, so far as its duty
to its servants is concerned, must exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence to make its road safe, whether
it constructs, purchases or leases it : St.
Louis, 4-c., Rd. v. Weaver, 35 Kans.
412 (1886).
(a.) The obligations of the master are
not discharged when he has taken care to
provide safe machinery and appliances,
but it is his duty to see that such machinery and appliances continue to be safe
and suitable. In Baker v. Allegheny Valley Rd., 95 Pa. St. 211, 215 (1880), itis
said that the master owes to his servant
the duty of providing safe tools and machinery, and that having done this he
does not engage that they will always
continue in the same condition. That he
would not be liable for any defect which
would become apparent in their use, it
being the duty of the servant to observe
and report such defect, he having the
means of discovering it not possessed by
the master. But the court held that this
principle did not apply in the case of such
appliances as the master was hound to
know could only last for a limited time,
it being his duty to renew such appliances
at proper intervals. The action in this
case was brought for an injury inflicted
on the servant by the breaking of a guy-

"The master is
rope of a derrick.
bound to know that a rope, under such
circumstances, will only last a limited
time. It will not do for him to furnish
a sound rope and then fold his arms until
by accidentally breaking it is demonstrated to be insecure." Having provided reasonably safe machinery and appliances, that it is his duty to use reasonable
diligence to keep them in that condition,
see Tierney v. Minneapolis, 4'c., Rd., 33
Minn. 311 (1885) ; Indiana Car Co. v.
Parker, 100 Ind. 181 (1884); Madden

v. M3finneanapolis, -c.,Rd., 32 Minn. 303
(b.) The master is notliable for injuries
resulting from a defect which could
not be discovered by careful inspection
or the application of appropriate tests :
Probst v. Delamater, 100 N. Y. 266
(1885).
But in all cases the master is bound to
disclose to the servant latent defects
and dangers of which he has knowledge, or of which he ought to have knowledge by the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence, and of which the servant
has no knowledge, and which he would
not discover by the exercise of reasonable care: Pittsburgh,d-c., Ry. v. Adams,
105 Ind. 151 (1885).
(c.) And in general the master is not
liable for injuries to servants resulting,
from defective machinery and appliances
in cases where the servant knew of the
defect, and notwithstanding it continued
in the service. He thereby voluntarily
assumes the risk and relieves the master
from liability: Central Rd.v. Haslett,
74 Ga. 59 (1884); Bell v. Western, 4-c.,
Rd., 70 Ga. 566 (1883); Ofanfield Coal
St. 185 (1879) ;
Co. v. McEnery, 91 PIa.

101 Sweeney v. Berlin, 4-c., Envelope Co.,
N. Y. 520 (1886) ; Mfarsh v. Chdcl.ering ,
Id. 396 (1886); Toull v. Sioux City, 6-c.,
Rd., 66 Iowa 346 (1885) ; Heath v.

Whitebreast Coal 4- Mining Co., 65 Iowa
737 (1885); Wells v. B. 6. R., 4-c., Rd.,
56 Id. 520 (1881) ; Schall v. Cole, 107
Pa. St. 1 (1884); Michigan Central Rd.
v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212 (1881).
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(d) But it has been held that a servant does not assume the risk of using
unsafe machinery because he knows of
the defect, unless he also understands or
ought to understand the risks incurred in
using it: Russell v. Minneapolis, J-c.,
Rd., 32 Minn. 231 (1884) ; and even
though the servant knew of the defect
and of the danger, and continued in the
service, yet may he recover if he had
reasonable grounds to believe that the
master had remedied the defect or would
immediately remedy the same: Berns v.
Coal Co., 27 W. Va. 285 (1885);
Greene v. Minneapolis, -c., Rd., 31
Minn. 248 (1883).
In Sioux City, 6-c., Rd. v. Finlayson,
16 Neb. 578 (1884), an action was
brought by an engineer to recover for an
injury caused by an explosion of an engine on which he was employed. He
had, some time prior to the accident, observed certain evidences of weakness in
the locomotive, and had called the attention of the proper authorities thereto.
They made an examination of it,-coneluded that there was no immediate danger, and instructed him to continue using
it until they could effect an exchange,
and cause the necessary repairs to be
made. The court stated the rule in this
case as follows : "If the defective machinery, though dangerous, is not of
such a character that it may not be reasonably used by the exercise of care,
skill and diligence, the servant does not
assume the risk. If the servant, in obedience to the requirement of the master,
makes use of machinery whicb, though
dangerous, is not so much so as to threaten immediate injury, or when it is reasonably probable it may be safely used
by extraordinary caution or skill, the
master would be liable for a resulting
accident."
(e.) Whether the machinery and appliances furnished by the master are
-easonably safe and suitable is a question for the jury to decide: Philadelphia,
i c., Rd. v. Keenan, 103 Pa. St. 124

III. Duty of the Masteras to Place.The master also owes to the servant the
duty of providing a suitable place in
which the servant can do his work without exposure to dangers that do not ordinarily come within the obvious scope
of such employment as is usually carried
on: Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. 423
(1879).
The machinery and appliances not being defective, the question has sometimes
been raised, whether the duty which the
master is under to furnish a safe place in
which the servant may work, does not
oblige the master to fence the machinery,
if by neglect to do so the place is made
unsafe. This matter was considered in
Sullivan v. India Manuf. Co., 113 Mass.
396 (1873), and it was said that if the
danger is apparent from the failure to
fence or cover the machinery, and the
servant has sufficient knowledge and ca.
pacity to comprehend the danger, he can
not complain that- the place might have
been made safer by such fence or cover.
ing, and that the master would not be
liable for his neglect to do so. Having
assented to occupy the place, the servant
assumes the risk. See Rock v. India,
Orchard Mills, 142 Mass. 528 (1886) ;
Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102
Mass. 572 (1869).
'In Cook v. St. Paul, 6-C., RPd., 34
Minn. 45 (1885), the plaintiff brought
an action to recover for an injury caused by the giving way of a floor on which he
was working at moving the ashes and'
debris, the building having been par
tially destroyed by fire. He was allowed
"The master's duty and
to recover.
liability to his servant," the court say,
"extend not only to such unnecessary
and unreasonable risks as are in fact
known to him, but to such as he ought
to know in the exercise of proper diligence, i. e., diligence proportionate to
the occasion."
In Armour v. Hahn, III U. S. 313
(1884), it is announced that the obligation of a master to provide reasonably
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safe placu and structures for his servants to work'upon, does not oblige him
to keep a building which they are employed in erecting in a safe condition at
every moment of their work, so far as its
safety depends on the due performance
of that work by them and their fellowservants.
IV. Duty of the Master in the case of
Inexperienced Servants.-It is the duty
of the master not to expose inexperienced servants, at whose hands he requires a dangerous service,without giving
them warning of the danger, and such
instructions as will enable them to avoid
injury: Rock v. Indian Orchard Mills,
142 Mass. 528 (1886); Atlas Engine
Works v.Randall, 100 Ind. 293 (1884);
Jones v. Nlorence Mining Co., 66 Wis.
268; Larson v. Berqunst, 34 Kans. 334
(1885) ; Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72
Ga..217, 228 ; Sullivan v. IndianMarauf.
Co., 113 Mass. 396, 398 (1873) ; Coombs
v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass.
596 (1869). In Hickey v. Taffe, 35
Albany Law Journal 354 (1887), the
New York Court of Appeals declares
that in putting a person of immature
years at work upon machinery which is
in some respects dangerous, an employer
is bound to give the employee such instructions as will cause him to fully understand and appreciate the difficulties
and dangers of his position and the necessity there is for the exercise of care and
caution, and that merely going through
the form of giving instructions, even if
such form included everything requisite
to a proper discharge of his duties by
such employee, would not be sufficient,
as such person must understand in fact
the dangerous character of the machinery,
and be able to appreciate such dangers
and. the consequences of a want of care.'
That if a person is so young, that after
full instructions he wholly fails to understand them, he is too young for such employment, and the employer puts him at
work at his own risk. If no such instruction has been given it will be suffi-

cient, if prior to the accident the servant
has acquired such knowledge and information from practical experience, which
is "the best of all teachers." And, in
general, a servant should never be exposed to unusual dangers, of which he is
ignorant, without giving him notice
thereof.
In Smith v.Oxford Iron Co., 42 N. J.
L. 467 (1880), the defendant was held
liable to a servant in its employ, injured
in using giant powder, a highly dangerous explosive. The plaintiff was employed as a miner, and at the time he
entered the service the ordinary blasting
powder was used, the use of the giant
powder, which was a more dangerous
explosive, being subsequently introduced. The court held, that before allowing this new compound to be intrcduced, the company owed to its sei rants
the duty of ascertaining and making
known to them its properties and the
mode of using it. "It was gross negligence in the company to furnish such an
article for a laborer's use without giving
him the requisite information. Whether
the company was aware of its dangerous
quality, or furnished it for use without
having taken steps to obtain such knowledge, it is equally liable. It was a duty
which the company, through Scranton,
was bound to perform, to see that such
reasonable care as the exigency of the
case demanded was taken, and to impart
to the subordinates full information as to
the manner of applying the new compound, before placing it in the hands of
an ignorant laborer."
V. Delegatzon of theMaster's Duty to
a Third Person.-Thedecision in Rogers
v. Tualow Manuf. Company, 35 Albany
Law Jour.410, (1887), shows the lawin
Massachusetts to be that the master
94cannot wholly escape responsibility"
for the condition of the machinery and
appliances used in his business, by dele
gating to servants the duty of keeping
them in repair; 'c that the negligence of
his servants in repairing, or in failing to
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repair, machinery is not necessarily the
negligence of the master, but that it is
also to be determined in each case, whether the master has exercised a reasonable supervision over his servants, and
reasonable care in seeing that his machinery is kept in proper condition, although he may have employed competent
servants, and furnished them with suitable materials, and instructed them to
keep the machinery in repair." This,
the Massachusetts court admits, "is perhaps not precisely the law as it is generally declared in the United States."
And the rule as it is generally declared
in the United States is, that a master
cannot escape liability by delegating to a
third person the performance of a duty
which he owes to his servants. On the
contrary, the person to whom he delegates such responsibility represents the
master himself, and his negligence in respect to the duty so imposed is the negligence of the master and not of a fellowservant: Kelly v. Erie Telegraph Co.,

34 Minn. 321 (1885) ; Drymala v.
Thompson, 26 Minn. 40 (1879) ; Mulvey
v. R. 1. Locomotive Works, 14 R. I. 204
(1883) ; Riley v. Rd., 27 W. Va. 145
(1885); Capper v. Louisville, 6-c.,
By.,
103 Ind. 305 (1885) ; Indiana Car Co.
v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181 (1884) ; Benzinq v. Steiwrnma,
101 N. Y. 547 (1886);
Chicago, &c., Rd. v. Avery, 109 Ill.314
(1884); NorthernPacific Rd.v. .lerbert,
116 U. S. 642 (1885).
VI. The Burden of Proof.-If the injured servant alleges that his injury is
due to the negligence of the master in
the selection of incompetent fellow-servants, or in failing to provide machinery
and appliances that were reasonably
safe, or to keep the premises in a safe
condition, the burden is on him to prove
such negligence on the master's part :
Pittsburgh, 6-c., Rd. v. Adams, 105 Ind.
151 (1885) ; Fraker v. St. Paul, 6-c.,
Rd., 32 inn. 54 (1884); Stafford v.
Chicago, 4-c., Rd., 114 I1. 244 (1885).
HENRY WADE RoGERs.

Court of Ajppeals of Haryland.
LAMB-v. STATE.
The criminal law should be clear and should not be extended by deductions.
While attempts to commit both felonies and misdemeanors are misdemeanors, and
indictable as such, when the attempt consists of nothing but a bare solicitation, it is
not indictable, if the substantive crime is but a misdemeanor.
The rule of the common law has not been altered by the Act of 1868, providing
for the crime of abortion: and an indictment charging the solicitation of a pregnant
woman to take drugs for the purpose of procuring abortion, is not within the terms
of that Act.

the Circuit Court for Baltimore county.
Indictment and conviction for a solicitation to take certain drugs
for the purpose of causing a miscarriage and abortion.
The indictment contained two counts, as follows:
Indictment.-State of Maryland, Baltimore County, to wit:
The jurors of the state of Maryland for the body of Baltimore
county, do on their oath present, that John C. Lamb, late of Baltimore county aforesaid, on the first day of April, in the year of
WRIT OF ERROR to
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our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five, at Baltimore
county aforesaid, in and upon the body of Rachel A. Taylor, then
and there being a pregnant woman, unlawfully and wilfully did
then and there attempt to commit an offence prohibited by law, to
wit, did then and there attempt to commit the offence of miscarriage and abortion of the said Rachel A. Taylor, pregnant with
child, as aforesaid; and in such attempt, did then and there do a
certain overt act towards the commission of said offence, to wit, did
then and there use, employ, furnish and supply and deliver, knowingly and wilfully, to the said Rachel A. Taylor, a large quantity
of a certain substance, medicine, and noxious and poisonous drugs
and preparations, to the jurors aforesaid unknown, for the purpose
of causing the miscarriage of her, the - Rachel A. Taylor, then and
there pregnant with child as aforesaid; but that the said John 0.
Lamb did then and there fail in the perpetration of said offence,
against the peace, government and dignity of the state.
Second Count.-And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present, that the said John C. Lamb, on the first
day of April, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eightyfive, at Baltimore county aforesaid, unlawfully and wickedly did
advise, solicit and incite one Rachel A. Taylor, then and there
being a pregnant woman, to take and swallow a large quantity of
a certain substance, medicine, and noxious and poisonous drugs
and preparations, to the jurors aforesaid unknown, for the purpose
of causing a miscarriage and abortion to her, the said Rachel A.
Taylor, then and there pregnant with child as aforesaid, and thereby
to commit the crime of abortion, against the peace, government and
dignity of the state.
To this indictment the defendant demurred, and his demurrer
was overruled. On the trial of the case the defendant was found
"not guilty on first count, but guilty on second count in the indictment," and was sentenced to imprisonment for two years in the
House of Correction.
Whereupon he took this writ, assigning for error the legal insufficiency of the second count raised by the demurrer.
Benjamin Kurtz, for appellant.
Roberts, Attorney-General, for the state," appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRYAN, J.-The indictment against the traverser contained two
counts. In the first it was charged that he attempted to commit
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an abortion on the body of one Rachel A. Taylor, who was a pregnant woman, and that the overt act towards the commission of the
offence was the supplying and delivering to the said Rachel of a
large quantity of noxious and poisonous drugs and preparations
for the purpose of causing the said abortion. The second count
charged that the traverser did advise, solicit and incite the pregnant woman to take and swallow a large quantity of noxious and
poisonous drugs and preparations for the purpose of causing an
abortion. The traverser demurred to both counts of the indictment. The demurrers being overruled, he was put on his trial and
acquitted on the first count, but convicted on the second. He was
sentenced to imprisonment for two years in the House of Correction.
The traverser was not regarded by the court below as havimg
incurred the penalties prescribed by the Statute of 1868. These
are imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not less than three
years, or fine; or both fine and such imprisonment. This statute
made great changes in the pre-existing law. It made it highly
penal to give notice by advertisement, printing or publication of
any place where any means could be procured for the purpose of
producing abortion, or where any advice, direction, information or
knowledge could be obtained for the purpose of causing the miscarriage or abortion of any pregnant woman at any period of her
pregnancy, and it also prescribed punishment for every person who
should sell, or cause to be sold, any medicine for this purpose, or
who should knowingly use or cause to be used any means whatsoever
for the same. It excepted from its provisions certain operations by
regular medical practitioners. By the ancient common law, according to Lord CoxE, "If a woman be quick with child, and by a
potion or otherwise killeth it in her womb, or if a man beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of 'adead
child, this is a great misprision, and no murder." But as the life
of an infant was not supposed to begin until it stirred in the
mother's womb, it was not regarded as a criminal offence to commit an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. A considerable
change in the law has taken place in many jurisdictions by the silent
and steady progress of judicial opinion, and it has been frequently
held by courts of high character that abortion is a crime at common
law without regard to the stage of gestation. In this state, however,
the change has been effected by the action of the legislature, and
not by the decision of the courts. The offences to be punished are

LAAB v. STATE.

defined with great minuteness and particularity, and the scope of
criminality in matters of this description is greatly enlarged. But
the acts charged upon the traverser in the second count are not
comprehended in the terms of the statute. The charge is that the
traverser solicited a pregnant woman to take certain drugs for the
purpose of causing an abortion. It is not stated that she took
the drugs. The act is germane to those prohibited by the statute.
It is an effort by solicitation to cause means to be used for guilty
purpose. It may be urged that a solicitation is an attempt, and
that an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is a misdemeanor. Pursuing the same train of inference and reasoning, we may go a step
farther, and maintain that as the solicitation is a misdemeanor,
an attempt at solicitation would, by the rule, be also a misdemeanor.
This process might be indefinitely extended so as to reach persons
very remotely separated from the act which the statute intended
to punish. Certainly it would be a great public calamity to invent
crimes by subtle, ingenious and astute deduction. In all free
countries the criminal law ought to be plain, perspicuous and
easily apprehended by the common intelligence of the community.
It is the essence of cruelty and injustice to punish men for acts
which can be construed to be crimes only by the application of
artificial principles according to a mode of disquisition unknown in
the ordinary business- and pursuits of life. The legislature, with
ample power over the whole subject, determined what offences
should be punished. If it had desired that other actions of a cognate character should become penal, it would have- so enacted. It
is the duty of the courts to interpret and administer the legislative
will, but in cases of criminal cognisance, they must resolutely
determine never to exceed it. It has frequently been stated that
an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is, by the common law, a misdemeanor. There are undoubtedly many instances in which this
is true. But it cannot be maintained as a universal principle.
The law has declared that an attempt to commit a felony or persuasion of another person to commit a felony is a misdemeanor.
And it has declared many acts to be misdemeanors where the
purpose of the offender was not consummated, although if consummated it would have been only offence of this grade. Acts of this
description are well defined and their character well understood.
There must be an unlawful purpose, and an act committed which
would carry it into immediate execution, unless it were prevented
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by some counteracting force or circumstance which intervenes at
the time. We may see an illustration of this doctrine in cases of
assault and battery. A battery is declared to be the unlawful
beating of another; and an assault is an attempt to beat another
without touching him. But it is held that a purpose to commit
violence on the person of another, if not accompanied by an effort
to carry it into immediate execution, falls short of an assault; and
that where an unequivocal purpose of violence is accompanied by
any act, which, if not stopped or diverted, will be followed by personal injury, the attempt is complete: State v. Davis, 1 Iredell (N.
0.) Rep. 125. The law would not be a practical system if it did
not define with precision the nature and circumstances of the
attempts which are criminal, and determine what acts are necessary
to make the attempt a substantive offence. In our judgment it has
done so, and not left us to grope after results under the guidance
of vague general expressions.
The act described in the second count is extremely immoral and
very offensive to the sensibilities of all virtuous people, but we have
no power to make a law for its punishment. The demurrer to the
second count ought to have been sustained, and as the traverser
was acquitted on the first count, he ought to have been discharged.
Judgment reversed.
As Judge BRYAx, in deciding the
principal case, has drawn the distinction
between attempts and solicitations, it
will be well to examine the law as to:
I. Attempts to commit a crime; II. Solicitations to commit a crime; IIL The
particular offence, the solicitation to commit which is here charged, viz.: "Abortion."
I. Attempts to Commit Crime.-Every
attempt to commit an offence is a misdemeanor, unless it is otherwise specially
provided for: I Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law 937; 1 Whart. C. L., 9th ed.,
759 ;
? 173; 1 Bishop's C. L., 7th ed.,
State v. Boyden, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 505;
State v. Barlow, 4 Mass. 439; Hackett
v.Com., 3Harris (Pa.) 95 ; Ricev.Com.
3 Bush (Ky.) 14; State v. Jordan, 7b
N. C. 27.
Attempts to commit murder and certain

other crimes have in some instances been
made felonies by statute: Steph. Crim.
Dig. 152.
This rule of the common law applies
both to felonies and misdemeanors: King
v. Philipps, 6 East 464; R. v. Mferedith,
8 C. & P. 589 ; R. v. Buller, 6 Id. 368 ;
R. v. Roderick, 7 Id. 795; HLackett v.
Com., 15 Pa. St. 95 ; Jordan v. State,
75 N. C. 27 ; State v. Boyden, 13 Ired.
(N. C.) 505; Nicholson v. State, 9 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 258 ; State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57;
Ross v. Com., 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 417;
Bhrdeaux v. Davis, 58 Ala. 611.
To constitute an attempt there must be
an intention to do the thing attempted,
which must itself be a substantive crime,
and not an inchoate offence, or one which
if accomplished would be indictable.
Hence, no indictment lies for an attempt
to commit an attempt, or an assault.
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White v. State, 22 Tex. 608 ; Brown v.
State, 7 Tex. App. 569 ; Taylor v.
State, 50 Ga. 79 ; except where it involves a breach of the peace : R. v.
King, 14 Cox C. C. 434. See State v.
Sales, 2 Nev. 268, where it was held
that embracery being bat an attempt to do
a wrong, there can be no indictment for
an attempt to commit embracery. Nor
for an attempt to commit a non-indictable offence, such as an attempt to commit suicide: Com. v. Denis, 105 Mass.
162 ; Cor. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422; but
in England an attempt to commit suicide
is held to be punishable as a misdemeanor: R. v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463;
R. v. Burgess, Leigh & C. 258; s. c. 9
Cox C. C. 247. And if one counsel another to commit suicide, and the other
by reason of the advice, kill himself, the
adviser, if present at the death, is guilty
of murder, as principal: Corn. v. Bowen,
13 Mass. 356 ; R. v. Dyson, Russ. & Ry.
523; R. v. Alison, 8 C. & P. 418;
otherwise if the one encouraging is not
present at the death : Russell's Case, I
Moody 356 ; R. v. Leddington, 9 C. & P.
79: nor does an indictment lie for an
attempt to commit a mere police offence:
Dobkins v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.)
424; Pulse v. State, 5 Id. 108; see
Whitesides v. State, 11 Lea (Tenn.)
474.
There must also be some act done
tending towards the accomplishment of
the crime. As was said by PEYTON,
C. J., in Cunningham v. State, 49 Miss.
685: "It is truly remarked by Mr.
Bishop in his valuable work on Criminal
Law, that there is no title less understood by the courts, or more obscure in
the text-books, than that of attempts.
There must be an attempt to commit a
crime, and an act towards its consummation. So long as an act rests in bare intention, it is not punishable; but immediately when an act is done, the law
judges not only of the act done, but of
the intent with which it is done; and if
accompanied with an unlawful and ma-

licious intent, though the act itself would
otherwise have been innocent, the intent
being criminal, the act becomes criminal
and punishable: Russell on Crimes, ed.
of 1826, p. 46. The word attempt signifies both the act and the intent with
which the act is done. The intent gives
color to the act to the extent of making,
under the circumstances, an act indictable or not, according as the intent is
greater or less in evil. And in considering technical attempts, the jury may take
into view the nature of the act as matter
of evidence to determine the particular
intent with which it was done."
Some overt act is necessary, for mere
preparation to commit a crime is not an
attempt. See attempt and preparation
distinguished, 1 Am. and Eng. Encyc.
of Law, 937. "Between preparation
for the attempt and the attempt itself,
there is a wide difference. The preparation consists in devising or arranging
the means or measures necessary for the
commission of the offence; the attempt
is the direct movement toward the commission, after the preparations are
made : People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159.
The law, therefore, does not consider it
an indictable attempt, where the purpose
is abandoned before the overt act is committed. "One may intend to commit a
crime and do many things towards its
commission, and yet repent of his pur,pose. The law gives to such a one a
locus pcenitentics. In such cases all
that has been done would amount only
to preparation :" Griffin v. State, 26 Ga.
493; Pinkard v. State, 30 Ga. 757 ;
State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57 ; Queen v.
McCann, 28 U. C., Q. B., 515 ; R. v.
Schofield, Cald. 397 ; R.. v. Taylor, 1
F. & F. 511.
But the failure to accomplish the
crime must arise from the intention of
the party charged : State v. Allen, 47
Conn. 121 ; McDermott v. People, 5
Park. C. C. (N. Y.) 102 ; Mulligan v.
People, Id. 105 ; R. v. Lewis, 9 C. & P.
523 ; R. v. St. George, Id. 483 ; Steph-
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ens v. Meyers, 4 Id. 349 : for mere inability on the part of the attemptor, or
impossibility in the thing attempted, will
not prevent a conviction for an attempt :"
Corn. v. Shaw, 134 Mass. 221 ; U. S. v.
Cole, 5 McLean 513. Thus, an attempt
at miscarriage may be proved, though it
appear that the woman was not actually
pregnant:'R. v. Goodall, 2 Cox C. C.
40; RI. v. Goodchild, 2 C. & K. 293;
Com. v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 ; except
in those cases in which the'impossibility
is manifest in the very means employed,
as where a man only threatens another,
for mere words do not constitute an attempt: 1 Whart. Cr. L., 9th ed., 147;
or points a pistol which is unloaded,
or which is at a distance beyond the
range at which a pistol can do execution :
.Tarver v. State, 43 Ala. 354 ; or a gun
loaded but not primed: 1. v. Carr,
Russ. & Ry. 377 ; or one of which the
touch-hole is plugged; .R. v. Harrs,
5 C. & P. 153. But even these will be
indictable attempts, if the person assaulted is unaware that he runs no
danger ; Crumley v. State, 61 Ga. 582 ;
or where the act tends to a breach of
the peace: Corn. v. White, 110 Mass.
407.
A change of purpose after the overt act
has once been done, so that the thing attempted, however, is not accomplished,
will not malke the attempt any less indictable ; thus on the question of an
attempt to commit a rape, STONE, J.,
said : "If the attempt was in fact made,
and had progressed far enough to put the
prosecutrix in terror, and render it necessary for her to save herself from the consummation of the attempted outrage by
flight, then the attempt was complete; and
an after abandonment by the defendant
of his wicked purpose, if it had proceeded
thus far, could not purge the crime."
Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380. See Taylor
v. State, 50 Ga. 79 ; Corn. v. Fields, 4
Leigh (Va.) 648; State v. Hayes, 78
Mo. 307 ; and if the act is in itself efficient to produce the effect intended the
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offence is complete, although the effect be
defeated by something extrinsic to the
act: State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500;
People v. Lawton, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 126.
It is no defence to an indictment for an
attempt to rape that the woman finally
consented: State v. Hartigan, 32 Vt.
607 ; State v. Cross, 12 Ia. 66 ; but see
contra, Hall v. State, 22 Wis. 580. See
generally, I Whart. C. L., ch. 8, 9th ed.,
and I Bishop C. L., ch. 51, 9th ed.
II. Solicitations to Commit a Crime.On the question, does a bare solicitation
constitute an attempt, that is, is a solicitation to commit a crime an indictable
offence, the law is not so settled, nor are
the courts uniform in their opinions. The
rule laid down by Wharton in his Criminal Law, 9th ed., 173, and quoted in
Cox v. People, 82111. 191,is as follows:
"They certainly are, when they in themselves involve a breach of the public
peace, as is the case with challenges to
fight and seditious addresses. They are
indictable when their object is interference with public justice: as where the
resistance to the execution of a judicial
writ is counselled; or where perjury is
advised, or the escape of a prisoner is
encouraged, or the corruption of a public
officer is sought, or invited by the public
officer himself. They are indictable,
also, when they are in themselves offences
against public decency; and they are indictable, also, when they constitute accessoryship before the fact. But where
the solicitation is not in itself a substantive offence, or where there has been no
progress made towards the consummation
of the independent offence attempted, the
question, whether the solicitation is by
itself the subject of penal prosecution
must be answered in the negative."
The rule here laid down would seem
to be that if the solicitation is to an
offence against public morals or policy
(see U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297 ;
Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, and State v.
Ellis, 33 N. J. Law, 102), where a mere
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offer to bribe was held indictable (but
see Hutchinson v. State, 36 Tex. 293,
where it was held that an offer to receive
a bribe is not indictable), or to a felony,
where the person making the solicitation
becomes an accessory, then the solicitation is an indictable offence, but otherwise not.
On the other hand, Bishop, I Crim.
Law, 7th ed.

767, et seq., lays down

the rule that all solicitations are attempts
and that the question whether they are
indictable or not depends on whether the
substantive crime to which they tend is
of sufficiently grave a character to induce
the courts to regard so remote an attempt
as a bare solicitation. For he says,
768, "as the soliciting is the first step
only in a gradation reaching to the consummation, the thing intended must, on
principles already explained, be of a
graver nature than if the step lay farther
in advance." This rule, of course, leaves
all solicitations to felonies and the higher
offences subjects of indictment ; but inasmuch as in the case of misdemeanors it
leaves the question almost entirely to
the individual opinion of each court, and
establishes no fixed standard, it can
hardly be considered satisfactory. In
support of this principle Bishop, 768,
cites a Connecticut case, where adultery
being a statutory felony, an unsuccessful
enticement to it was adjudged to be an
indictable attempt : State v. Avery, 7
Conn. 266 ; while in Pennsylvania,
where it is only a misdemeanor, punishable by fineand imprisonment not
exceeding a year, it was held otherwise:
Smith v. Com., 54 Penn. St. 209 ; saying : "And this contrariety of conclusion appears to proceed, not so much
from differing views of the two courts,
as from the differing enormity of the
substantive offence." But this argument will hardly seem sound when it is
considered that it has been held in Illinois, (Cox v.People, 82 1ll. 191), thata
solicitation to commit incest is not indictable, although incest itself is very

severely punished in that state, but is
only a misdemeanor; and in California
that preparations, for an incestuous marriage, even to the extent of an elopement
and a request that one of the witnesses
should go for a magistrate to perform
the ceremony, are not an indictable
attempt: People v. Murray, 14 Cal.
159 ; nor is the English case cited,
namely, R. v. 1?ansford, 13 Cox C. C.
9, at all at variance with this view, as
Mr. Bishop claims, for the substantive
crime there involved is sodomy, which,
since the statute 25 Hen. 8, c. 6, has
been a felony. See Davis v. State, 3
Har. & J. (Md.) 154. The leading
English case on this subject, R. v. Higgins, 2 East 5, which decided that to
solicit a servant to steal his master's
goods was a misdemeanor, though it be
not charged in the indictment, that the
servant stole the goods, nor that any
other act was done except the soliciting
and inciting, is not out of harmony with
this reasoning, for the substantive offence
there charged was also a felony, and all
laid down by the court is (see page 18,
by GOss, J.), "An

attempt to com-

mit even a misdemeanor has been shown
in many cases to be itself a misdemeanor.
Then if so, it would be extraodinary
indeed, if an attempt to incite to a felony
were not also a misdemeanor."
Of a similar character are all the cases
cited by Mr. Bishop, in which a solicitation has been held indictable, as in the
case of larceny: R. v. Collingwood, 6
Mod. 288; Pennsylvania v. McGill,
Addison (Pa.) 21. Overtures to commit sodomy: R. v. Hickman, 1 Moody
34 ; R. v Rowed, 6 Jur. 396 ; or else,
the solicitation has been made a statutory misdemeanor, as in England, where
by special statute solicitation to assassination has been made a misdemeanor:
24 & 25 Vict. C. 100,

4; R. v. Most,

L. R., 7 Q. B. Div. 244.
On the other hand, the cases are numerous in which the bare solicitation to
commit an offence, not a felony, nor
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against public morals or policy, nor
This argument of the judge, however,
tending to the breach of the peace, but seems to go too far, inasmuch as a solicia misdemeanor simply, whether male in tation to be allowed to commit a rape is
se or maia prohibita, has been held not to an impossible thing, the substantive crime
be an indictable offence. Thus in Penn- requiring force and not solicitation ; yet
under an English statute (7 W. 4 and 1
sylvania, it has been held that a solicitation to commit an offence is not an Vicet., c. 85, s. 3,) almost in the same
attempt, and that therefore, though an words and from which the Pennsylvania
attempt to commit a misdemeanor is a statute was copied, it was held that the
delivery of poison to an agent with
misdemeanor, it is not indictable, "to
solicit, incite and endeavor to persuade"
directions to him to cause it to be ada married woman to commit fornication or ministered to another under such circumadultery: Smith v. Coin., 54 Pa. St. 209. stances that, if administered, the agent
In this state this seems to have been ex- would be the sole principal felon, is not
tended even to solicitations to commit a an attempt to administer poison :" R. v.
felony, for in Stabler v. Com. 95 Pa. St.
Williams, I Car. & 0. 589 ; s.c. 1 Den.
318, in which it was held that the mere C. 0. 40; R. v. Carr, Russ. & Ry. 377.
delivery of poison to a person and solicitThis hesitation and irariance in the
ing him to place it in the spring of a cer- decisions in cases of solicitation to comtain party was not an 1attempt to admin- mit certain felonies seems to have arisen
ister poison" within the act of 31 March from the phraseology of the different
1860,
82, the court (M.RCUR, J.), statutes. See Com. v. Flagg, 135 Mass.
545, where it was held to be an indictable
used the following language: "Mere
soliciting one to do an act, is not an offence to solicit one to burn the barn of
attempt to do that act." R. v. Butler, 6 another: State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307 ;
Griffin v. State, 26 Ga. 493. But in
C. & P. 368; Smith v. Com., 54 Penn.
Michigan a solicitation to set fire to a
St. 209. In this last case it was said:
' In a high moral sense it may be true building, and the furnishing material
that solicitation is attempt, but in a legal therefor, has been held not to be indictasense it is not.' In some cases it has ble : McDade v. People, 29 Mich. 50.
In New York, where the statute is exbeen held although a solicitation to commit a misdemeanor, does not constitute pressed in more general terms, a solicitation to set fire to a barn, accompanied by
an attempt to commit the misdemeanor,
yet a solicitation to commit a felony, does the furnishing of materials for the purconstitute an attempt to commit the pose, was, on the contrary, held to be an
felony. This view does not appear to indictable attempt under the 2 R. S.
have been adopted in Pennsylvania. The 583, 2d ed., sect. 3, which provides that
case of Kelly v. Com., I Grant 484, was " every person who shall attempt to coman indictment for murder charged to have mit an offence prohibited by law, and in
been committed in an attempt to commit such attempt shall do any act towards the
a rape. It was held that acts were ne- commission of such offence, hut shall fail
cessary to constitute an attempt. That in the perpetration thereof, &c. :" Peoan attempt to commit a rape was an in- ple v. Bush, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 133.
The Massachusetts view of the law is
effectual offer by force with intent to have
carnal knowledge. If such acts, with well laid down in the case of Com. v.
Willard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 476, where a
such intent were not proved the prisoner
purchaserof spirituous liquors, inviolation
could not be convicted of the attempt;
that it should be an actual not a con- of the statute, refused to testify, on the
ground that it would criminate himself.
structive attempt. An intent to commit
" It is difficult," said SHAW, C. J., "to
fornication was insufficient."
VOL. XXXV.-82
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draw any precise line of distinction between the cases in which the law holds
it a misdemeanor to counsel, entice or
induce another to commit a crime, and
where it does not. In general it has
been considered as applying to cases of
felony, though it has been held that it
does not depend upon the mere legal and
technical distinction between felony and
misdemeanor. One consideration, however, is manifest in all the cases, and
that is that the offence proposed to be
committed by the counsel, advice or enticement of another is of a high and
aggravated character, tending to breaches
of the peace, or other great disorder or
violence, being what are usually considered mala in se, or criminal in themselves, in contradistinction to mala proIdbita, or acts otherwise indifferent, than
as they are restrained by positive law.
All the cases cited in support of the
objection of the witness are of this description. B. v. Biqgins, 2 East 5, was
a case where the accused had solicited a
servant to steal his master's goods, and
it was held to be a misdemeanor. The
crime, if committed pursuant to such
solicitation, would have been a felony.
B. v. Phillips, 6 East 464, was a manifest attempt to provoke another person
by a letter, to send a challenge to fight a
duel. For although the direct purpose
of the letter of the defendant was to induce the other party to send a challenge,
which is technically a misdemeanor, yet
the real object was to bring about a deed
which is a high and aggravated breach
of the public peace, and where it results
in the death of either party is clearly
murder. It was averred to be done,
with an intent to do the party bodily.
harm, and to break the king's peace, and
such intent was considered a material
fact, to be averred and proved. A case
depending upon a similar principle in
our own books is that of Com. v. Harrington, 3 Pick. 26, in which it was held
that to let a house to another with an
intent that it should be used and occupied

for the purposes of prostitution, with the
fact that it was so used, was a misdemeanor. The keeping of such a disorderly house has long been considered a
high and aggravated offence, criminal
in itself, tending to general disorder,
breaches of the public peace and of common nuisance to the community."
See
also Com. v. Ross, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.)
417. "It is in cases of this character
only that the principle has been applied ;
but we know of no case where an act
which previously to the statute was lawful or indifferent is prohibited under a
small specific penalty, and where the
soliciting or inducing another to do the
act, by which he may incur the penalty,
is held to be itself punishable. Such a
case may perhaps arise under peculiar
circumstances, in which the principle of
law, which in itself is a highly salutary
one, will apply; but the court are all
of opinion that it does not apply to the
case of one who, by purchasing spirituous
liquors of an unlicensed person, does, as
far as that act extends, induce that other
to sell in violation of the statute."
In discussing this subject in the case
of U. S. v. Henning, 4 Cranch C. C.
608, where it was held that to attempt
to sell a free mulatto as a slave for life
was not an indictable offence : the court,
TRusToN, J., said: "I am willing to
lay down this rule, and without some rule
we are afloat in an ocean of uncertainty,
'that all attempts to commit an offence,
which, if carried into execution would
go to corrupt the fountains of justice, of
legislation or the executive administration of the law ; or if perpetrated would
involve actual violence or breach of the
peace, whether statutory or common law
offences, are indictable, otherwise not.'
We have adjudged that to incite another
to commit an assault and battery, is indictable ;" (see UnitedStates v.Syles, 4
Cr. C. 0. 469. But an examination of
this case will show that the opinion was
given without any reasoning, and that
the court was not certain on the matter;
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thus, the court, MORRELL, J., not very
clear, and THRUSTON, J., doubting,
CRsNci, C. J., not doubting, was of
opinion that it was an indictable offence ;
and see under the heading "Attempts
to commit a crime," that even attempts
to commit an assault are not indictable).
"This is the only case of the kind that I
am aware of; and there I think we have
gone to the utmost limit; but I look upon inciting another to commit a breach
of the peace, of more aggravated criminality than an attempt to break the peace
oneself. I hardlyknow how such a case
can well be manifested. A man might
in a passion say and threaten, that he
would beat another, but is held back by
friends and others present, or he might
approach another in a threatening manner, and that other might have the heels
of him and run away. I should question much whether either of these demonstrations of hostility are indictable. We
have not gone that far yet."
The principle to be drawn from these
cases seems to be, that the question,
whether a solicitation to commit an offence is indictable or not, depends rather
on the grade than on the enormity of the
substantive crime. And this seems to be
not only in accordance with the eases, in
which a solicitation to commit the truly
enormous offences of incest, or of administering poison, has been held not to be
indictable. See Cox v. People, 82 Ill.
191 ; People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159 ;
Stabler v. Com., 95 Penn. St. 318; R.
v. Williams, I Car. & K. 589 ; R. v.
Carr, Russ. & Ry. 377 ; while a solicitation to commit an offence much less atrocious than these, such as theft, has been
held indictable: R. v. Higgins, 2 East
5; but also to be proper, inasmuch as
the grade of a crime is fixed by the law,
and is therefore certain, while its enormity has no other bounds than the views
of the particular court before whom the
indictment may be laid.
Although no such reasoning is to be
found in the books, the following may be

offered as a plausible explanation of the
distinction, in regard to the indictability
of solicitations, founded upon the doctrine of principal and accessory. Thus
if A. solicit B. to throw stones at C., and
he does so, and wounds C., B. is indictable for wounding C., and A. is also indictable as principal in the crime ; but if
A. solicit B. to murder C., and he does
so, A. is only indictable as an accessory
before the fact, and until B., the principal, is convicted, he can not be tried. If
therefore A. solicit B. to throw stones at
C., and he does not yield to the temptation, no crime has been committed, and
there can be no principal, consequently
A. is not indictable ; and this is what is
meant when it is said that the bare solicitation to commit a misdemeanor is not indictable. On the other hand, if A. solicit
B. to murder C., or to some other felony,
and B. does not do it, although the crime
that A. desired to effect has failed of accomplishment, he is still an accessory
before the fact, and it can make no difference whether the crime has failed
through the action of B., or for some
other cause ; A.'s offence is not that of a.
principal, but that of an accessory, and
he is still indictable, for to wait until the
conviction of B. would be never to try
A., since the crime not having been committed, B. is not indictable. Thus one
who encourages another to commit suicide, but is not present at the act which
causes the death, is an accessory before
the fact, and at common law- escaped
punishment only because his principal
could not be first tried and convicted :
Bussell's Case, Moody 356 ; B. v. Leddington, 9 C. & P. 79. It is for this reason that the cases of solicitation to administer poison have been held not indictble, for while if the poison were admintered and the person poisoned died, it
would be a felony, and the person soliciting would be an accessory, the mere
administration is a misdemeanor only,
and where it is not administered the person soliciting can not be indicted as
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principal, nor can there be an accessory
'to such an offence. And while the
statutes have provided for cases of actual
administration or attempts to do so, they
have made no provision for cases in
which the attempt is not made. See
Penn. Stat., 31st March 1860, sect. 82,
P. L. 403, Purd. Dig. 430, pl. 149 ; 7
Wim. 4 and I Vict., c. 85, sect. 83;
Stabler v. :or., 95 Penn. St. 318 ; R.
v. Williams, 1 Car. & K. 5b9. The
only exception is where the offence is
against the public as distinguished from
an offence against private individuals, in
which cases it has been held necessary to
override this doctrine and make solicitations to such offences indictable. Of such
a character are challenges, opposition to
judicial process, perjury or bribery, &c.
See the cases cited above, and I Whart.
Crim. Law, 9th ed., sect. 179.
III. Solicitations to Commit Abortion.
-The indictment in the principal case
contained two counts, one charging the
accused with an attempt to commit an
abortion upon a certain woman, being
then and there pregnant ; and the other
with advising, soliciting, and inciting the
said woman to take and swallow certain
drugs and medicines for the same purpose. The prisoner was ac uitted on
the first count, therefore the sole question
before the Court of Appeals was the
legal sufficiency of the second count.
As has been seen, at common law a
solicitation to commit a misdemeanor,
with some exceptions, is not indictable,
and abortion (see I Russell on Crimes,
9th ed., 899 ; Roscoe's Crim. Evidence,
7th Am. ed., 267; State v. Cooper, 2
Zab. (N. J). 52,) is a misdemeanor, except under certain special circumstances
prescribed by statute. For a discussion of such a statute, and as to whether
it includes solicitations as well as attempts, see Com. v. W., 3 Pitts. (Pa.)
462. Unless, therefore, abortion is within these exceptions, or the solicitation to
that crime has been made indictable by

statute, this second count was bad. But
these exceptions are of such misdemeanors only as affect the public, among which
abortion has never been reckoned, the
danger to the mother and child alone
causing its criminality: I Russell on
Crimes, 9th ed., 670. Further the substantive crime charged, namely, advising
a certain woman then and there being a
pregnant woman, was not a sufficient
allegation of the crime of abortion, which
at common law is the destruction of the
life of an unborn child, and implies that
the woman was quick with child: 1 BI.
Com. 129. Afull review of the law on
this point may be seen in the opinion of
HINES, J., in Hitchell v. Com., 78 Ky.
204; s. c. 10 Cent. Law J. 338, which is
so exhaustive on the subject that it may
be advantageously repeated at length:
"The statutes of the state being silent on
the subject, it is not an offence in this
state to produce an abortion if done before the mother is quick with child. In
Com. v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387, decided in
1812, it was held that the averment that
the woman was quick with child at the
time of the abortion was essential to the
validity of the indictment. This case
was followed and approved in Com. v.
Parker, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 263, decided
in 1845, in which it was held that.to
produce an abortion on a woman, before
she was quick with child, and with her
consent, was not a punih-hable offence at
the common law. Subsequently the
legislature of Massachusetts passed an
act making the destruction of the ftutus,
at any time, punishable : Stat. 1845,
ch. 27. In Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48,
decided in 1851, the same view as -to
what the common law was is expressed.
In State v. Cooper, 2 Zab. (N. J.) 53,
to produce an abortion previous to the
quickening of the child, was held not to
be punishable at common law. Upon
the other hand, as to what the common
law is, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expresses the contrary view, holding that the offence is punishable at con-
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mon law, whether committed before or
after the woman has become quick: Mills
v. Com., 13 Penn. St. 633. It is there
said : ' The next error assigned is, that
it ought to have been charged in the
count that the woman had become quick.
But although it has been so held in
Massachusetts and some other states, it
is not, I apprehend, the law in Pennsylvania, and never ought to have been the
law anywhere. It is not the murder of
a living child which constitutes the offence, but the destruction of gestation by
wicked means and against nature. The
moment the womb is instinct with embryo
life and gestation has begun, the crime
may be perpetrated.' The only authority
cited in this opinion is an opinion of the
same court (Com. v. Demain, 6 Penna.
L. J. 29; s. c. Brightly 441), delivered in 1846, and section 308 of
Wharton's Criminal Law. Mr. Wharton
on Criminal Law, sects. 1220 to 1228
inclusive (7th ed.), expresses the opinion
that the rulings by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court are a correct exposition
of the common law upon this question.
The only direct authority cited by him in
support of his view is the case of Com. v.
Demain, of Mills v. Com., above referred
to, and B. v. Wycherly, 8 C. & P. 265.
But it will be seen from sect. 1221 that
the exact point under discussion was not
decided in the Demain case. Although
the point was elaborately argued by
counsel, it was not decided by the court.
They are reported as saying that the indictment sufficiently averred that the
party injured was pregnant and quick
with child, which was killed. The only
bearing that thecase of Reg. v. Wycherly,
8 C. & P. 265, has upon the case is as to
the meaning at common law of the expressions quick with child and with quick
child. Gunxxn, B., after taking medical
counsel, said: 'Quick with child is
having conceived ; with quick child is
when the child is quickened.'
This distinction is denied, however, in State v.
Cooper, 2 Zab. (N. J.), 53. * * * So
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far as my researches have gone, I have
found no precedent, no authority, nor
even dictum (prior to Lord Ellinborough's Act, 43 Geo. III., c. 58),
which recognises the mere procuring of
an abortion as a crime known to the law.
* * * In R. v. Phillips, 3 Campb. 73,
in reference to an indictment found under
the statute just quoted, and construing
the statute, it was said that the words
'quick with child' must be taken to be
according to the common understanding,
which was proved to be that a woman is
not considered to be quick with child till
she has felt the child alive and quick
within her. Mr. Russell on Crimes,
and Roscoe on Criminal Evidence, cite,
in support of the view taken by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a precedent in 3 Chitty Crim. Law 798, which,
on examination, will not be found to be
in conflict with the position that when
the abortion or miscarriage is produced
with the consent of the woman, and before she is quick with child, it is not an
offence at common law. All the counts
of the indictment charge an assault upon
the woman, and the conclusion from the
averments is, that the act was done without her consent, which is an assault at
common law, with aggravations; and
while it is not alleged that the woman
was quick with child, it is charged
that she was pregnant and big with child,
and that the act was. done by the defendant wilfully, maliciously, and with
the felonious intent to kill and murder
the child. The whole proceeds upon the
averment that she was pregnant with
child, and so far advanced as to be regarded in law as having a separate existence, a life capable of being destroyed,
which is equivalent to the averment that
she was quick with child: Com. v. Parker, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 263. In the interest of good morals and for the preservation of society, the law should punish
abortions and miscarriages wilfully procured, at any time during the period of
gestation. That the child shall be con-
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sidered in existence from the moment of
conception, for the protection of its rights
of property, and yet not in existence
until four or five months after the inception of its being, to the extent that
it is a crime to destroy it, presents an
anomaly in the law that ought to be
provided against by the law-making
department of the government. The
limit of our duty is to determine what
the law is, and not to enact or dtclare it as it should be. In the di.%
charge of this duty, and after a patient
investigation, we are forced to the conclusion that it never was a punishable
offence at common law to produce, with
the consent of the mother, an abortion
prior to the time when the mother became quick with child. It was not even
murder at common law to take the life
of the child at any period of gestation,
even in the very act of delivery. The
indictment in this case does not allege that
the woman was quick with child. It does
not allege that the potion was administered with the intention to destroy the
life of the child, nor that such was the
result produced by it." See also, I
Arch. Cr. P1. & Pr., pp. 951 and 952;
3 Coke's Inst. 50 ; R. v. Hewitt, 4 F.
&F. C. O. 1101; R. v.Scudder, 3 C.
& P. 605 ; Ball v. Hancock, 15 Pick.
(Mass.) 256; State v. Howard, 32 Vt.
380; Evans v. People, 49 N. Y. 86;
State v. Emerick, 13 Mo. App. 493;
Hatfield v. Gano, 15 Ia. 177 ; State v.
Slagle, 83 N. C. 630; Com. v. Wood, 11
Gray (Mass.) 85; Com. v. Jackson, 15
Ibid. 187. At common law, therefore,
a solicitation to commit abortion was not
indictable.
The common law, however, has been
variously modified by statute in different
states; thus, in England the crime of
abortion is made independent of the question whether the woman be with child or
not, and it is made a felony: 24 & 25

Vict. c. 100, S. 58 ; while the supplying
the means thereof is only a misdemeanor:
Same act, s. 59. In Pennsylvania the
mere attempt to procure an abortion has
been made a felony: Act 31st March,
1860, 88. In New York, on the other
hand, it is. a misdemeanor only: Act
May 13th, 1845, 2 ; People v. Lohnman,
2 Barb. (N. Y.) 216 ; People v. Stockman, I Park. C. C. (N. Y.) 424"; unless
it result in the death of either woman or
child, in which case it is a felony: People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95.
The question, therefore, as to whether
a solicitation to commit abortion is indictable or not will depend, first, on
whether the substantive crime has been
made a felony by statute ; and, secondly,
if it is only a misdemeanor, on whether
the words of the statute are sufficiently
comprehensive to include solicitations.
See Corn. v: W., 3 Pittw. (Pa.) 462,
where it was held that inducing a woman
to jump off a ladder with intent to procure a miscarriage was within the meaning of the 88th section of the Code in the
words, "or other means whatsoever."
The Maryland statute on this subject:
Rev. Code 1878, Art. 72,
16, page
787, falls within none of these. It does
not make abortion a felony, therefore, in
Maryland the common law still prevails and abortion is a misdemeanor;
nor do the effective words of the statute,
viz.: "who shall knowingly use, or
cause to be used, any means whatsoever
for that purpose," afford any grounds
for including mere advice to take drugs
or medicine. Compare McDade v. PeopIe, 29 Mich. 50, where the words " or
shall by any other means attempt to
cause any building to be burned," was
held not to include a mere "invitation to
burn."
SAMUEL HINDs TxoMAs.
Philadelphia.
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THOIASON v. TERRITORY.
Where, on a trial for a murder, of which the accused was the only witness, it
appears, from his own evidence, that he sought out deceased while engaged at his
work chopping wood, armed with a rifle and revolver, and shot him when he was in
the act of fleeing, having dropped his axe, there being no evidence that there was
any gun which he could get, the court will exclude evidence of threats by deceased,
as in such a case-they would be no justification.
Where, on a trial for murder, there is no evidence tending in the slightest manner
to show a killing in self-defence, there is no error in a refusal to instruct the jury on
the law of self-defence.
Where, on a trial for murder, there is no evidence to indicate murder in any degree less than the first, there is no error in refusing to instruct the jury on the other
degrees of murder.
Where, in a trial under an indictment for murder before a jury, a portion of which
cannot speak English, and a portion of which cannot understand Spanish, the jury,
after having retired twice, requested the court to send the official interpreter to interpret between them, on the ground that they are unable to communicate with each
other, and such interpreter is specially sworn, and sent into the jury room, over the
exception and objection of the defendant, no presumption arises that such interpreter
acted improperly and to the prejudice of the defendant, but it is for the defendant to
show prejudice if any arose.
Where, on an indictment for murder, the prosecuting attorney has fully and fairly
developed the facts by witnesses called by him before resting his case, there is no
error in the court not requiring him to call all the witnesses to conversations with
the defendant who were known and present,
APPEAL from the District Court, Socorro county.

William Bleeden, Attorney-General, for appellee.
.Fislce J Warren, and J. 8. Tiffany, for appellant.

The facts appear in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
LONG, 0. J.-The defendant in the court below, who is appellant
here, was presented by indictment in the District Court of the
Second Judicial District, sitting in the county of Socorro. The
indictment charges the defendant with murder in the first degree.
He pleaded not guilty, was placed upon his trial before a jury at
the November term, 1885, and a verdict of guilty of murder in the
first degree was returned, upon which judgment was regularly entered. From this judgment the defendant appeals. Four alleged
errors are presented to this court by assignment and in argument
as a reason why the cause should be reversed, and a new trial
directed. They are stated in appellant's brief as follows: "First,
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the court erred in excluding evidence of previous threats and assaults by deceased ; second, the court erred in sending the interpreter into the jury room where the jury were considering their
verdict, against defendant's objection ; third, the court erred in not
requiring the prosecution to call all the witnesses to conversations
with defendant who were known and present; fourth, in refusing
to give the instructions respectively asked by the defendant."
These alleged errors cannot be fairly determined without a consideration of the facts established by the evidence. On the 19th
day of December 1885, the defendant shot and instantly killed the
deceased in the county of Socorro. The killing occurred in the
woods, when the parties were alone together, with no other witness
of the transaction. The deceased being instantly killed, his version
of the affair was not before the jury. In the morning the deceased
went to the woods to chop poles, and was engaged in that work
when, without any previous warning, the defendant appeared before
him, while deceased was busy chopping. The defendant in his own
evidence, taking up the occurrence at the point of meeting, says :
" I went to Mr. Potter (the deceased), and asked him-he asked
me, in fact-what I had come there for, and I told him I had come
to have a talk with him, to see if we could not settle that difficulty
without any more trouble or hard feelings; and he remarked, 'I
will settle nothing ; I expect to do just what I said I would do ;'
and started for a tree or bunch of trees that was about thirty or
forty feet away. I told him when he first started to stop. He
made no halt until he got in about eight or ten feet of this tree.
I again told him to stop, and he turned, facing me or nearly so,
and still leaning in the direction of me, and in the direction of the
tree, as though he was still aiming to get to that tree, and get a
gun, and I shot him, and he turned around, and made about two
steps, and fell. After that I turned, and started back to the field
to where I was at work. I was about thirty-five to forty feet from
the tree near where he fell, at the time I shot." It also appeared
from the evidence of J. R. Beavers that he was, on the morning of
the killing, working in the field with the defendant, and that he
(defendant) left the field, and was gone about one hour, when he
again came back within that time to the field. The witness Nabor,
on re-direct examination, testifies that defendant, after the killing,
said to witness that the deceased set his axe down when the defendant came up to the place where deceased was chopping. George
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Earle testifies that on the 19th he was working in a field for him-

self and the deceased; that he went to work about eight o'clock in
the morning, and found defendant at work in the field hauling
barley ; that he saw the defendant leave the wagon with which he
was at work and go away; that he watched him while he went about
fifty yards, and witness then resumed work ; that this was near a
mile from where the deceased was killed. Soon after defendant left
this field and went away, the witness heard a shot fired, and imme-b
diately heard some one cry out, three times, " Oh ! oh ! oh 1" the
first one loud, the next not so loud, and the last one faint. In
about twenty-five minutes the defendant came back to the field
from the direction where the shot was fired and the cries heard,
and was armed with a rifle and pistol.
There is nothing whatever in the evidence to throw a shade of
doubt on the facts thus proven, except as to the position of deceased
when he was shot. There is evidence tending very greatly to prove
that deceased was killed while chopping, and in the act of striking a
blow on the limb of the tree with his axe. Giving the defendant
all there is in his own evidence, it places him near the tree at the
time of the killing. The facts, beyond doubt, are that defendant
knew deceased was in the woods. He doubly armed himself, and
went nearly a mile to seek him out. What the thoughts were that
possessed his mind, and induced his action, can best be determined
by what he did. He came upon the deceased wholly unarmed, who
almost instantly started to flee, no doubt seeing the rifle in defendant's hand. As he fled, the defendant commanded him to halt,
and upon the first moment, at the very instant the command was
obeyed, and his body come to a rest, so that certain and deadly aim
could be taken, the defendant fired upon deceased, and killed him
in his tracks. Deceased had neither gun nor pistol, but was shot
down in cold blood, while on the retreat. No weapons of any kind
were behind the tree, or elsewhere within the reach of the deceased.
Under such circumstances, evidence of previous threats by deceased
would add nothing in favor of defendant, if introduced. He was
not being assaulted or advanced upon or threatened or menaced.
No weapon of any kind was within sight of the defendant or deceased, or present in fact, except the weapons of the defendant.
Speaking of prior threats, the learned author of Whart. on Hom.,
§§ 694, 695, says : " Certainly, if such evidence is offered to prove
that defendant had a right to kill the deceased, there being no
VOL. XXXV.-83
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proof of hostile demonstration by the deceased, then it is irrelevant.
No man has a right to take another's life, if, by appealing to the
law, he can avoid the encounter; for if A. threatens B.'s life, and
the threat is known to B., his duty is to have A. arrested by due
process of law, not to shoot him. On the other hand, if the question
is as to which party is the assailant, then it is admissible to prove
by prior declarations of either that the attack was one he intended
to make. If defendant knew beforehand that his life was threatened, he should have applied to the law for redress."
This is certainly a salutary principle. It involves no personal
humiliation, and is certainly no evidence of cowardice, for one who
is threatened by another for his life, to appeal, in the first instance,
to the law to interpose its preventive protection. Such a principle,
well settled in law and adopted in practice, would tend to the protection of human life and preservation of order. The idea, if permitted to gain ground, that one who is threatened with great bodily
harm must take his life in his hand, arm himself, and seek out his
adversary, and either kill or be killed, will produce constant personal conflict, violence and disorder. Such a doctrin e is as pernicious in morals as it is destructive of life and productive of evil
results. It should, by statute, be made the duty of the prosecuting
officers, upon receiving official information of such threats, to
file, on their own motion, an information requiring the party making such threats to appear before some court having jurisdiction,
and then to make inquiry, and, if the threats alleged are established, to require a substantial bond to maintain the peace. This
should be an affirmative proceeding by the territory, on its own
behalf, to protect life and preserve order. While these observations
may not be necessary to the determination of the point involved,
if they shall induce the legislative department to take action, some
good may result therefrom.
Returning to the point involved. "Fbr the purpose, therefore,
in cases of doubt, of showing that deceased made the attack, and,
if so, with what motive, his prior declarations are evidence :"
Whart. Horn., § 695.
Evans v. State, 44 Zdiss. 762, also cited in Her- & T. Cas. 328,
is in point. The facts cited in that case were as follows: "The
prisoner and deceased were plantation negroes. They had a difficulty. The deceased made threats of death against the prisoner.
The prisoner, being armed with a gun, invited deceased, who was
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at work in a field, to come to the cabins, and they would have it
out. The deceased started for the cabins, and, while approaching,
apparently with the intention of getting his gun, the accused shot
and killed him." Evidence of the prior threats were offered, but
excluded, and it was contended that this ruling was erroneous. The
court there say: "If the excluded testimony had remained for the
consideration of the jury, it would have had no influence on the
verdict, unless there was testimony that the deceased at the time
of the killing sought a deadly contest with the accused, or was
making some demonstration towards the accomplishment of his
threat. There were no developments which would have given this
evidence a feather's weight."
The two cases are much alike. In the Mississippi case the deceased was shot as he approached, as it was claimed, seeking a gun,
with which to kill defendant. Here the deceased was shot as he
fled, as it was claimed, without an item of evidence, however, to
support the contention, going to get a gun for the same purpose.
In HAfers v. State, 33 Tex. 542, the court discuss a question
like the one here. In that state it seems, from the opinion, "when
a party is accused of homicide, he may justify the homicide by
proof of threats against his own life by the slain party." In applying this statute the court say : "If the justification is attempted
upon the grounds of such threats, * * * it must be unequivocably
shown that the party slain was doing some act at the time of the
killing which manifested an intention to carry the threat into execution. It is necessary that there-should be at the moment some
positive demonstration of the fell purpose."
In Harrisv. State, 47 Miss. 325, it is held: "No mere threats
by the deceased are admissible on a trial for murder in justification
or palliation of the homicide, unless, in addition to such threats,
there was also at the time of the killing some attempt or demonstration by the deceased showing a present purpose and imminent danger
of carrying such threats into execution, or doing the defendant great
bodily harm." To the same effect are Hughey v. State, 47 Ala. 97;
State v. Hall, 9 Nev. 58.
It is not doubted, where there is any evidence which tends to
show, even in the slightest degree, that the deceased at the time
of the killing was advancing in a threatening manner on the defendant, or occupied a menacing attitude towards him, or made the
slightest move towards attack, or did any act indicating a present
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intent to do defendant great bodily harm, that in such cases evidence of prior threats by deceased against the prisoner, and communicated to him, would be competent evidence to be weighed by
the jury. The courts should be careful about excluding evidence
of this character, and may do so only when there is an entire absence of such circumstances. If there is even slight evidence to
indicate that the act of killing was done under a present, reasonable apprehension to himself of great bodily harm, prior threats
should not be excluded. In this case, the defendant did offer to
prove prior threats, but did not offer to farther prove that deceased
made hostile demonstrations even of the slightest kind towards defendant, at the time of the killing, nor did he show a gun was
behind the tree, or a weapon of any kind, or that the defendant so
believed. Under these circumstances, the defendant having sought
out the deceased, the court below was right in excluding the evidence. If it were true that deceased had made threats against the
.defendant, the latter should not have doubly armed himself, and
followed up the deceased in a manner likely to cause conflict.
The observations of the learned court in Harris v. State, supra,
are very pertinent to the present: "While courts must adhere to
reason and justice, as developed by time, experience and enlightened
adjudication, they must, nevertheless, enforce the laws with all the
rigor of which they are capable, as a duty alike to the law-abiding
and criminal; for should it become the recognised right of a man
to pursue and shoot down another for a threat to take life simply,
without any overt act indicating an intention to carry the threat
into execution, crime and violence would run riot. * * * To
allow prior threats to be given in evidence, under such circumstances, upon the mere proof of a naked and wanton killing, as in
the case at bar, would be to invite a multiplication of tragedies."
We find no error in the ruling below excluding this evidence.
There was no evidence whatever beforb the jury tending, in the
slightest manner, to show a killing in self-defence ; so there was
no error in the refusal to instruct respecting the law of self-defence.
There was no evidence to indicate murder in any degree less
than the first. It was a clear, undoubted case, on the evidence
really before the jury, and including that offered and excluded," of
murder in the first degree, and nothing whatever to indicate anything less ; so there was no error in refusing to instruct as to the
other degrees.
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The next contention made by defendant presents a question of
greater difficulty. It is one, so far as can be found in our research,
never decided. Questions somewhat analogous have, however,
been determined, and the ruling here must be settled by the presumption which is to prevail respecting the action of the interpreter.
Did the court err in sending an interpreter to the jury?
The principle contended for by defendant is discussed in the cases
cited below. It is there, in effect, held that, when the defendant
relies upon an alleged irregularity of the court or jury, the burden
is upon him not only to show it, but also to show he was prejudiced
thereby: Beins v. People, 30 Ill. 273; Adams v. People, 47 Id.
376; State v. Wart, 51 Iowa 587, 2 N. W. Rep. 405; People v.
Douglass, 4 Cow. 26; Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. 549. Authority, however, may be found to the contrary.
The general rule is stated in Thompson and Merriam on Juries,
§ 349, in this manner: " The courts generally agree that, where the
interference of strangers with the jury has not been promoted by
the prevailing party, has not been attended with corruption, and it
does not reasonably appear that substantial prejudice has resulted
to the party complaining, the verdict will not be disturbed for this
reason, whether the cause be civil or criminal, capital or otherwise.
* * * The fact of communication, without more, creates in the view
of some courts an unfavorable presumption, which, unexplained,
will overturn the verdict; whereas, in the view of other courts, the
mere fact of such a communication will not be ground for setting
aside the verdict, unless it be made to appear probable that prejudice resulted from it."
It is thus seen there is no well-settled, definite rule on the point
raised by appellant as to the presumption arising from such -n irregularity, if it be one, as that complained of. A great weight of
authority can be cited, holding that the presumption is against the
verdict from an unauthorized communication to the jury after retirement, while equally strong and respectable authority is to the contrary. This condition of the authorities should forcibly suggest,
at least in capital cases, where any act has in fact operated to the
prejudice of the defendant, that it be shown, and should induce
the officers prosecuting for the state, where it is even- alleged that
a prejudicial irregularity has been committed, to show to the court
below, and incorporate in the record, the facts which prove that no
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harm resulted to the prisoner, rather than to leave so important a
matter to turn upon a technical legal presumption, not well settled.
It will not be necessary to enter upon an analysis of those cases
which hold tmat, when an irregularity is shown with respect to the
jury, during deliberation, it is presumed to be hurtful to the prisoner, or of those which hold to the contrary, for this case may fairly
be determined upon its own facts, as they differ in essential particulars from most of those decided. Jurors in this territory, in
the District Court, are upon the panel at every term who do not
understand or speak the English language, and by their side are
those who do not understand or speak the Spanish. Fully threefourths of those qualified for jury duty are Mexicans, with either a
limited knowledge of the English, or wholly ignorant of it. Under
such circumstances, the statute provides for an interpreter, who
acts under oath, and who is an officer of the court, and through
him the business is conducted in both languages. While it is not,
in terms, provided that such an interpreter may attend the jury in
its deliberations, yet the necessity therefor is frequently imperative. The record in this cause discloses such a necessity. It recites
the facts as follows : "It was afterwards shown to the court that
there were both Spanish and English-speaking persons on the jury,
and that they were unable to communicate with each other, and
that the jury requested the court to furnish them with an interpreter. The defendant objecting to this, the request was at first
denied, but afterwards, the request being renewed, with the statement that an interpreter was absolutely necessary, the official court
interpreter was specially sworn, and sent into the jury room, over
the exception and objection of the defendant."
This case must stand on its peculiar facts. A jury was in deliberation without the power of communication with each other.
All possibility of deliberation or agreement was thus cut off. The
jury twice earnestly asked to be supplied with a medium of communication. An officer of the court, specially provided by statute
to interpret evidence, was first sworn, and then sent to the jury
room. The presumption is, in the absence of the oath, that it was
not to communicate to the jury, but only to act as the medium of
communication, and take no part in the deliberation. He could
not have been an embarrassment to the jury, for that body twice
earnestly asked for his presence. The interpreter did not intrude
himself upon the jury as a mere listener, but went by direction of

THOMASON v. TERRITORY OF NEW

E-XICO.

the court, on the request of the whole panel. This case is not
like one where, unbidden, a stranger goes into the jury room as a
spy upon the deliberations, or as an unwelcome intruder. Such a
person might be a restraint upon that free interchange of opinion
so important to correct results. It is not in this case shown, or
attempted to be proven, that the interpreter said a word, or performed an act, inimical or prejudicial to the prisoner, or that any
juror was restrained in the exercise of his duty, or in the slightest
influenced by the presence of the interpreter. Acting under oath
and the order of the court, the presumption should be in favor of
proper action by him, rather than against it. Under the circumstances, we are not willing to hold the presumption is that he
acted improperly and to the prejudice of the defendant. If this
officer of the court did or said anything prejudicial, that is a: fact
for the defendant to show in the court below in the first instance.
The ruling in this case on the point under consideration is predicated entirely on the facts of the case, the composition of the jury,
its inability to communicate within its own body in the absence of
an interpreter, its repeated request, the official position of the person sent in, and his oath. Under such a state of facts, there is no
presumption that he did or sought to influence the verdict, or did
anything wrong or prejudicial to defendant. We do not express
any opinion as to the presumption in other irregularities, arising
from the action of one not sworn, or directed specially by the court.
Juries, in capital cases especially, should be carefully guarded; but
we cannot hold a rule so strict and technical as to often work a
mistrial when juries are so constituted that they cannot communicate. Nothing hut the most urgent necessity should excuse the
court in sending, even under the situation in this territory, an
interpreter to the jury; but such an urgent case existed in the court
below.
As to the last noint, we do not believe it was the legal duty of
the prosecuting attorney to call the remaining witnesses. He had
fully and fairly developed the facts before resting the case, and he
was required to go no further. We find no error in the record.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
HENDERSON, J., concurred.
A motion for a rehearing having been made, the following
opinion was delivered:
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PER CURIAm.-The defendant in this cause files a motion for rehearing, and urges a further alleged error on the trial below. The
new contention is that the court, at a time when the jury was deliberating, made to and received communications from them in the
absence of the defendant; also that the proceedings respecting the
appointment of an interpreter to the jury were held in the absence
of the defendant from the court-room.
The first question to determine on this contention is whether the
facts shown in the record sustain the position argued. If, in fact,
the defendant was in the court-room when such proceedings were
taken, and such communication was not so held in his absence, then
defendant's motion must be denied. It is necessary, therefore, to
consider the record, which is as follows :
" T erritory v. Jasper Tomason. (Murder. No. 757.)
"At the same regular term of said District Court, on the 8th day
of December A. D. 1885, the same being the 18th day of said term,
the following among other proceedings were had and entered of
record: The trial of this cause proceeds, and again come the parties, the defendant being present by counsel as well as in his own
proper person, the arguments of counsel are heard, and, on receiving the instructions of the court, the jury retire to consider of their
verdict, in the custody of a sworn bailiff; and the jury request that
they may be furnished with an interpreter, and the court, upon investigation, -finding it necessary that an interpreter be furnished in
order that the jury may communicate with each other, appoints E.
V. Ohaves as such interpreter, who is specially sworn to interpret
between the members of the jury in this cause, and to keep secret
their communications and investigations. Now again come the
parties, the defendant being present by counsel as well as in his own
proper person, and comes also the jury ;" (and the record recites
the return, at that point in the trial, of the verdict).
This is the record as shown on four of the transcripts. The same
proceedings are also shown in the- bill of exceptions at p. 88, as
follows: " And thereupon the jury retired to consider their verdict. It was afterwards shown to the court that there were both
Spanish and English-speaking persons on the jury, and that they
were unable to communicate with each other, and the jury requested the court to furnish them with an interpreter. The defendant objecting to this being done, the request was at first denied, but
afterwards, the request being renewed, with- the statement that an
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interpreter was absolutely necessary, the official interpreter was
sworn, etc."
It is evident that these recitals both refer to the same transaction, and should be construed together, as they contain all the
proceedings upon the contention involved. Counsel for defendant
places special emphasis on the use of the word "afterwards."
That word is used simply to denote that the request for an interpreter was later in time than the retirement ; but does it therefore
follow that the request came from the jury while deliberating in
their room separate and apart from the court, rather than in open
court, in presence of the defendant? As a matter of fact, the
room in which jurors deliberate is often adjoining and immediately
opening into the court-room, and it frequently occurs, especially
when the evidence is manifestly clear and convincing, and so the
return of the jury is apparently a matter of very short time, that
the prisoner remains in the court-room under the custody of the
sheriff, and it may well be concluded that such was the case in this
instance. The record really affirmatively discloses that the defendant was in court in person until after all the proceedings respecting
the interpreter were taken. The instruction of the jury, the request for an interpreter, the fact of his being sworn, are, by a fair
reading of the record, shown, as we think, to be one continuous act
in presence of the defendant, in open court. The record affirmatively shows the presence of the defendant when the instructions
were given. There can be no presumption that he then retired ;
and that he did not, in fact, do so, but remained in person in court
during all the proceedings respecting an interpreter, is apparent
from the recitals in the record, especially in view of the statement
therein "that the defendant objected to this being done." The
motion for a new trial presented for the consideration of the court
below has been carefully examined. It nowhere states that the
court communicated with the jury, either by message or otherwise,
at a time when the jury was deliberating, separate and apart from
the court. Neither does it state the interpreter was appointed and
sworn by the court, and sent to the jury, either in the absence of
the jury from the court-room, or in the absence of the defendant.
If, in fact, the court had received a message from the jury while
they were deliberating in some other place, asking for an interpreter, and the court had, in the absence of the defendant, considered such message, and determined to grant their request, and
VOL. XXXV.-84
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had then, in defendant's absence, selected such interpreter, and
caused him to be sworn and sent to the jury, such a proceeding
would, beyond all doubt, have so deeply impressed the learned
counsel who so ably represents the defendant, that it would have
been made a ground in the motion for a new trial in the court below.
The absence of such a cause in the motion confirms the view we
have taken respecting the construction of the record on the point
involved in this motion.
Upon a careful reconsideration, the motion for rehearing must be
denied, and it is so ordered.
In the early stages of trial by jury,
the twelve men were chosen because they
were witnesses of the transaction and
had personal knowledge of the facts involved in the controversy between the
plaintiff and defendant. Then for an
intermediate period, both the personal
knowledge of the jury and the evidence
produced by the parties were relied upon
as the basis of their finding. And as
the changing circumstances of society
made it impossible to obtain twelve men
who had personal knowledge of the facts
in dispute, the jury finally emerged into
the present form, where it is their duty
to weigh the testimony and find their
verdict from the evidence. As early as
the time of Henry IV., it seems to have
been the custom to supplement at least,
the imperfect knowledge of the jury by
evidence, and in a case reported in the
year book of the second year of that
reign, it is said, "after the jury are
sworn they should not take with them
any other evidence than that presented
to them in court." In the time of Henry
VI., the jury still appear to be chosen
because they were witnesses ; and in the
time of Charles II., in 7 State Tr. 267,
personal knowledge of a juror was no
ground of objection to him. From a
description of a trial
given by Fortescne
in his De Laudibus Legum Anglize, in
the time of Henry VI., it appears that
the province and duty of the jury was
about the same as at the present time.

He says, "after the opening, each party
has liberty to produce before the court
all such witnesses as they may please or
can get to appear on their behalf, who
being charged upon their oaths, shall give
in evidence all that they know concerning
which the parties are at issue; and, if
necessary the witnesses may be heard
and examined apart. The whole evidence being gone through, the jurors
shall confer together at their pleasure as
they shall think most convenient upon
the truth of the issue before them, with as
much deliberation and leisure as they can
well desire."
As it became necessary to supplement,
or supply, the jurors' personal knowledge
of the facts by the testimony of witnesses,
it became important to confine the jury to
the testimony given under the sanction:of
the court as the ground of their finding,
and therefore they were sworn to give
their verdict according to the evidence.
Obedience to this rule implies that the
jury shall consider such evidence only as
the court admits, and forbids the reception
of evidence from any source outside of
court; any interference with the free
deliberation of the jury by the judge,
parties or third persons; any misconduct
on the part of the jury, which would
show that they had not considered the
evidence, or had acted through prejudice.
In Trials Per Pais, ch. 12, it issaid to
be "a maxim and old custom in the law
that the jury shall not eat or drink after
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they be sworn, until they have given in
their verdict, without the assent of the
justices ; and if they eat at the costs of
the parties, the judgment will be arrested." * * * "If they, after the evidence
is given to them do, at their own charge,
eat or drink, either before or after they
agree upon a verdict, it is fineable ; but,
if before they agree, they eat or drink
at the charge of a party, and the verdict
be given for him, it shall be void, but
not, if it be given for the other party.
But, if after they agree, they eat or
drink at the charge of him for whom they
give their verdict, it is not void."
In a case in 1 Dyer, 6 H. VIII., it was
alleged in arrest of judgment that the
jury had eaten and drank. It was
proved that when the jury had agreed and
were returning to give their verdict they
saw Chief Justice REDE going to an
affray, and they followed him, " et in
veniendo viderunt
sc'phum
unde
bibernnt." The jury was fined, but the
plaintiff held his verdict. In 2 Dyer
218, after the jury had been charged,
they returned and said that they were
all agreed except one, who had eaten a
pear and had a drink of ale, which
enabled him to hold out. At the plaintiff's
request they were sent back, and afterwards found a verdict for him. The
verdict stood, but the juror was committed. In Leon. 1 Part 133, a jury remained out so long that a search was
made by the court officers, who discovered that two of the jurors had eaten
figs before they agreed, and three had
pippens in their pockets but did not eat
them. The jurors who had the refreshmens were fined, but the verdict was
not disturbed. In a case in Godbolt,
three of the jurors had sweetmeats in
their pockets and were for the plaintiff,
but upon being searched they promptly
agreed with the other nine mid found for
the defendant. The court decided that
whether they had eaten the sweetmeats
or not, they were fineable, as it was a
very great misdemeanor for them to have

them. In the case of Duke of Rirmond
v. Wise, Trials PerlPais, supra, the court
say : "If the jury receive a treat from
the plaintiff, after they have agreed but
before they deliver their verdict, the
verdict is good ; but if they change their
verdict by reason of a treat from either
side it is not good. Otherwise most verdicts given at the assize would be void,
for it is the usual thing for the jury to
receive a collation, after the privy verdict,
from the party for whom it is given."
In Hugqhes v. Budd, 4 Jur. 150, it was
held that the presence of the jury at
intervals during the trial in the same
roomwith the plaintiff's attorney,smoking
and drinking, was sufficient ground for
a new trial. In Everett v. Youells, 4
BI. Ad. 681, it was decided that a verdict would not be set aside, merely
because food was delivered to a juryman after the jury retired, unless it was
furnished by a party, or enabled the juryman to hold out. In Cooksey v. Hayles,
27 L. J. (Ex). 371, a new trial was
granted on the ground of misconduct
where the jury covertly procured food.
In the case of Morris Y. Viviun, 11 L. J.
(Ex.) 367, two of the jurors had been
entertained by the defendant, during the
trial. It was admitted that this was
customary in that part of the country
where public accommodations were inadequate, and the plaintiff who moved
for a new trial upon the ground that the
rule of law had been violated, admitted
that he did not believe that the jury had
been influenced nor that there was any
ground of suspicion of unfair conduct.
The court refused a new trial, and state
the law to be that " where all that remains
for the jury is to deliberate and give their
verdict, if they eat or drink at their own
expense, they may be fined; if at the
expense of the party for whom they give
the verdict it is void. The cases seem to
apply to the whole jury, and only to acts
done by them after they are charged.
This case does not fall within the rule."
A verdict is avoided when the jury,
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after retiring, receive any evidence from
a party for whom they decide, but not
if they decide for the opposite party.
(Trials Per Pais, supra.) If they carry
out with them any unsealed evidence,
which had been given at the trial, it is
an irregularity, but the verdict is good :
I Inst. 227 b. In Metcalfe v. Deane,
1 Cro. Eliz. 189, a verdict was set aside
where the jury, after retiring, examined
a witness who had testified in the case.
In a case cited in Trials Per Pais, supra,
a verdict was set aside where one of the
parties said to the jury, after they retired, "you are weak men; it is as clear
of my side as the nose on a man's
face;" as this affirmation was new evidence which might much persuade the
jury. And in a case in Keb. 300, 1st
Part, it is held that a verdict is avoided
if the servant of one of the parties speak
to the jury and the verdict is for his
master; but not, if it is for the other
party. In a case in 11 H. IV,, 17, a
judgment on a verdict for plaintiff was
stayed, where he had given to a juryman
before he was sworn an escrow, which he
afterwards showed to his fellow jurymen,
although it gave the same testimony as
the plaintiff when he testified in the case.
In Spencely v. De Willott, 3 Smith 321, a
new trial was refused where the principal
witness had distributed a printed statement containing the evidence he afterwards gave, as it did not appear to have
been seen by the jury. In Coster v.
Merest, 3 B. & B. 272, a new trial Nvas
granted where handbills, containing reflections on plainliff's character, had
been distributed in court and shown to
the jury, although the defendant denied
all knowledge of them. In Kinq v.
3urdett, 2 Salk. 645, a new trial was
refused where the jury obtained an act of
common council which had been in evidence. Tile court say, "this was an
act of neither side, but was evidence for
both." It was, however, admitted to be
an irregularity.
In Gainsford v. Blachford, 6 Price

(Ex.) 36, a new trial was granted where
the judge, who was summing up in favor
of one party, was stopped by the jury who
said they were satisfied, and immediately
gave a verdict for the opposite party.
And in Dent v. The Hundred of Hertford,
2 Salk. 645 a verdict was set aside
where the foreman declared that the
plaintiff should never have a verdict
whatever witnesses he produced. In
Allum v. Boultbee, 18 Jur. 406, a new
trial was granted because a juryman had
expressed himself against the defendant
before he heard his case.
Tie same rule has been followed in
this country, although there have been
variations in its application in different
localities and by different courts. It has
been held generally that the judge or
justice can instruct the jury only in open
court and in presence of the parties. In
Sargent v. Roberts, I Pick. 337, the jury
after retiring and being out for some
time, qent a written communication to
the judge, stating that they could not
agree.
To this the judge replied in
writing, giving them certain instructions,
and under these they found a verdict. It
was admitted that it had been for years
the practice in Massachusetts for such
communications to pass between the
judge and jury. But the supreme court
decided that such practice was improper,
and, although the instructions so given
were correct, anew trial must be granted
because they were given in private. The
same application of the rule was followed
in .11sh v. Smith, 12 Ind. 563; Hoberg
v. State, 3 Min. 262. In Crabtree
v. Iagnbaugh, 23 I1. 349, a verdict
was set aside merely because the judge
went into the jury room during the deliberations of the jury, although when
there he merely declined to explain certain written instructions. The court say,
"we choose to assume that what was
said and done by the judge while in the
jury room did not influence the jury, for
we think th6 judgment should be reversed
for the simple reason that such an inter-
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view did take place. If this verdict is
allowed to stand because, in this case, no
harm was done, we open the door in all
such cases to the inquiry as to whether the
party has been injured." In Watertown
Bank and Loan Co. v. Mix, 51 N. Y.
558, the jury, after retiring sent a written communication to the judge, asking
whether a witness had proved a certain
The judge handed this to the
fact:
stenographer, who, after looking at his
notes, wcote on the paper, "No such
question was asked," and the judge then
returned the paper to the jury. All this
was done without the knowledge of
A
the plaintiff, who lost the verdict.
new trial was granted and it was
held by the court, that it was not
incumbent on the party who moved for a
new trial, on the ground of a communication between the judge and jury, to
such had
show affirmatively that
tended to his injury. But in Goldsmith
v. Solomons, 2 Strobb. 296, a different
view of the right of the judge was taken
and the law of Sargent v. Roberts was
criticized adversely. The foreman returned after the jury had retired and
asked the judge how their verdict
should be if they found against the will.
To this he replied without communicating with counsel. The supreme court
held that no error had been committed.
"All such matters," they say, "must be
left to the discretion of the judge. To
hold that after the jury is sent out and
the constable sworn to take charge of
them, and the court is adjourned over to
the next day, the judge should have no
communication with the jury, is pushing
judicial coyness to the very verge of
Where such communimere prudery."
cation is made with the consent of the
parties, it has been held that there is no
reason for a new trial: Bunn v. Croul,
10 Johns. 239. But in Taylor v. Betsford, 13 Ibid. 487, it was held that such
consent must affirmatively appear, and
could not be inferred from the fact
that the parties knew what the justice

had done. Such assent may be inferred
from circumstances, as where in Eancook v. Salmon, 8 Barb. 564, the justice
went into the jury room at the request
of the jury and with the knowledge and
consent of the parties, a consent that he
might read the testimony to the jury was
implied. Merely answering "no," by
the justice to a question from a jury is
not ground for a new trial. Thayer v.
Van Vleet, 5 Johns. 111.
The reception of evidence by the jury,
after they retire to consider of their verdiet, is still forbidden. Some courts
have enforced the rule in this respect
very strictly; while others have relaxed a
little, and seem to hold that the verdict ought not to be interfered with,
unless such evidence was supplied by a
party or with his consent, or had been
obtained irregularly by the jury or exercised an improper influence upon them.
New trials were granted in the following
cases, where the jury during their deliberations had the minutes of testimony
taken by plaintiffs' attorney, although it
was not shown how they obtained them:
Durfee v. Eveland, 8 Barb. 46; where
they obtained and read without consent
of court or parties a newspaper which
contained, correctly reported, a portion
of the charge delivered to them: Farrer
v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54; where they
sent for and examined a witness who
had testified in the case : Thompson v.
Mallet 2 Bay 94 ; where they consulted
books and papers referred to by the witnesses : Loth v. Macon, 2 Strobh. 178 ;
where a juror in an action for a breach
of contract for sale of stock, obtained from
a broker the price of certificates at a certain time, and communicated this to the
others: Brunsn v. Graham, 2 Yeates
166; where they received from the
plaintiff a statement of certain expenditures which were involved in the suit :
Ibid. 273; where a paper containing the
plaintiff's claim for damages was accidentally passed with other papers to the
jury: Benson v. Fish, 6 Greenl. 141 ;
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where a deposition not read in evidence
was taken out and read by the jury, the
court holding that the jury could not tell
how far their minds might have been influenced by it: Stewart v. Burlington,
&.,
Rd., 11 Iowa 62; to about the
same effect are Coffin v. Gephart, 18 Ibid.
256; Bronson v. Metcalfe, 1 Disney
(Ohio) 21 ; Watson v. Walker, 23
N. H. 471 ; also where a juryman, after
retiring, communicated to his fellows a
statement of facts which he knew of his
own knowledge, but had not disclosed in
court: Sae v. State, 1 Swans. 61; where
a paper which might have influenced the
jury came before them by accident and
was read. The court intimated that if
the paper had not been read a new trial
would not have been necessary: Killen
v. Sistrun, 7 Ga. 283. But a new trial
has been refused where the jury celled in
the county clerk to make a calculation
for them after they had reached a conclusion: Dennison v. Powers, 35 Vt. 39 ;
where a paper not in evidence went out
with the jury, the court held that it must
appear that the paper gave information which by a reasonable intendment
might have had some influence upon the
jury in making up their verdict: Town
of Peachamv. Carter, 21 Vt. 515 ; where
the notes of counsel were taken out by the
jury, it was held, that a new trial would
not be granted unless they had been surreptitiously introduced by counsel, or had
had some influence upon the jury; and
the testimony of the jury was heard to
prove how the notes had been obtained
and what influence they had: Ball v.
Carley, 3 Ind. 577. The same view was
taken in a criminal case: Bersch v.
State, 13 Ibid. 434; and in Rix v.
Drury, 5 Pick. 296. And it was held
not to be improper for the jury to refresh
their recollection by reading the notes
of interrogatories which had been read
upon the trial: Andrews v. Tinsley, 19
Ga. 303.
The jury are expected to look to the
court for their information upon the law

of the case. In The State v. Snith, 6
R. J. 33, a verdict was set aside because the jury, during their deliberations, consulted the Revised Statutes, and
so, in Newkirk v. State, 27 Ind. 1,
where they consulted Bishop's Criminal
Law. But that the jury helped themselves to the law, was not considered a
sufficient ground for setting aside their
verdict in Commonwealth v. Jenkins,
Thatcher's Criminal Cases 118.
There is considerable difference of
opinion as to what is an improper interference with the jury on the part of the
officer in charge of them. A new trial
has been granted for this reason, where
the sheriff, without any authority, told
the jury that unless they agreed speedily
the judge would take them with him to
another county: Oholstoa v. Gholston, 31
Ga. 625 ; where the officer in charge said
within the hearing of the jury, "this is
a worse case than D.'s." * * * "Public
opinion is against the accused."
The
court say, "the officer is required by his
oath as well as by the nature of his duty
not to speak to the jury during their deliberations:" Nelms v. The State, 13
S. & M. (Miss.) 501. In Slaughterv.
The State, 24 Tex. 410, a verdict was
set aside because the officer stayed in the
jury room. And it has been held that
in no case should the officer in charge be
present during the deliberations of the
jury, nor speak to them, except to ask
whether they had agreed: Rickard v.
State, 74 Ind. 275 ; McClary v. The
State, 75 Id. 261 ; Stull v. Snyder, 20
Kern. 306. In The People v. Knapp, 42
Mich. 267, a new trial was moved for
on the ground of the officer's presence.
The court below refused it. But the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment
and held, in an opinion by CooLar, J.,
that such presence must to some extent
operate as a restraint. A new trial was
granted where the officer told the jury
that the court had adjourned and left orders to lock them up all night, unless
they agreed; that the case was clear for
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the plaintiff, and they had better agree
and go home: Thomas v. Chapman, 45
Barb. 98.
Where, however, it affirmatively appeared that the jury had paid no attention to an attempted interference by the
officer, a new trial was refused: Baker
v. Simmons, 29 Barb. 198; and a new
trial has been refused where the officer
in answer to a juror's question how
'long they would be kept together, replied,
he did not know: Leach v. Wilbur, 9
Allen 212 ; also where the officer told
the jury they should have no food until
they agreed. Itwas held that this being
an illegal communication, it could not
have operated prejudicially to the accused : Popeand Jacobs v. The State, 36
Miss. 121. In Taylor v. Everett, 2 How.
Pr. 23, the constable in charge communicated in writing to the foreman that a
boy had been ground up in his mill, and
emphasized this statement by drawing
his hands across his legs. The foreman
swore that from his desire to get home
after receiving this intelligence, be agreed
to a verdict he would not otherwise have
agreed to, and two jurors said, that out
of sympathy for the foreman, they also
had agreed. Seven of the jurymen swore
that the information had not influenced
them in arriving at a verdict. A new
trial was refused, the court holding that
they could not receive the affidavits of
jurors as to what had influenced their
verdict.
A new trial has been granted where
the circumstances have been such that,
through the fault of the officers, an improper influence might have been exerted
on the jury, without proof that it actually has been. In Bare v. Sate, 4
How. (Miss.) 187, after the jury retired,
they were left in charge of one who was
not a sworn officer, in the absence of the
bailiff. SnArttcr, C. 3., said, "If the
purity of the verdict might have been
affected, it must be set aside. No doubt
must rest upon it." In Boles v. The
State, 13 S. & M. (Miss.) 398, after the
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jury retired, they were taken, with the
prisoner's consent, to a hotel to dine, an
officer sitting between them and the
guests. After dinner, a barber was admitted to their room, who shaved some
of them, and remained a few minutes
during the bailiff's absence. There was
no evidence of any tampering with the
jury. A new trial was granted. The
court say in their opinion, "It would be
an unsafe rule to hold that the verdict
must stand unless tampering was proved.
The prisoner would not be able once in
a hundred times to show this. No one
must be allowed to speak to the jury.
Were this rule departed from, the verdiet would rest upon the discretion of the
court." In McCann v. The State, 9
S. & M. (Miss.) 465, it was held that
where the whole jury, or a part, were
exposed to undue influence by being in
charge of an unsworn officer or by having opportunity through separation of
conversing with third persons, the verdict
would be set aside, unless it affirmatively
appeared that no undue influence had
in fact been exerted upon the jury. As
early as Commonwcalth v. McCau, 1Va.
Cases 271, it was held sufficient ground
for a new trial, that the jury might have
been subjected to improper influence
through an unjustifiable separation. In
Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496,
after the jury had retired, one of the
constables in charge and a stranger carried reasonable refreshments into their
room, but no conversation respecting the
case took place. A new trial was granted,
StAw, C. J., stating the law to be,
"The result of the authorities is, that
where there is one irregularity, that may
affect the impartiality of the proceeding,
as where refreshments have been furnished by a party, or the jury have been
exposed to such influence, as where they
were improperly separated, or have received unauthorized communications,
there, inasmuch as there can be no certainty that the verdict has not been improperly influenced, a new trial must
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be granted; but where the irregularity
consists in that which does not and cannot affect their impartialtty and disqualify them from exercising their judgment,
the verdict will stand."
Mere exposure to influence either from
the parties or third persons, is not generally sufficient ground for a new trial,
unless it appears that such influence actually was, or might- have been, beyond
a reasonable doubt, exerted.
A verdict was set aside where the
counsel for the party who afterwards
obtained the verdict entertained two of
the jurors during the trial : Walker v.
Hunter, 17 Ga. 364. In Luster v. The
State, 11 Humph. 169, it was held that
the mere presence of a stranger in the
room during the jury's deliberations,
where there was no conversation and no
motive for the intrusion, and no attempt
to confer with the jury, was insufficient
ground for a new trial. In Ned and
Taylor v. State, 33 Miss. 364, after the
jury retired, one of them called through
the window to his wife to bring his supper. The person who brought it remained in the jury room, but had no
communication with the jury. A new
trial was refused, the court saying "1a
verdict rendered under circumstances
that might affect its purity, will be set
aside; but otherwise, it will not be."
In People v. Boggs, 20 Cal. 432, it was
held that where the interference of strangers with the jury was unattended with
corruption and has not been prompted
by a party, and it docs not appear that
injustice has been done, the verdict will
not be disturbed in either criminal or
civil cases. In Collier v. State, 20 Ark.
36, it was said that although the jury be
guilty of misconduct, by conversations
and interviews with others during the
progress of the trial, a new trial will not
be granted if it appear that there was no
abuse, and no injury resulted to the defendant. In this case several witnesses
swore, upon a motion for a new trial,
that the prosecuting attorney and his as-

sistant had been seen singing with the jury
after the daily adjournment of the court,
during the progress of the trial. It appeared that these musical attorneys occupied a room adjoining that used by the
jury, both of which opened on a porch
of the hotel, where the singing had taken
place. The attorney swore that he only
assisted the jury, who were unable to
carry the time, by giving them the " proper air." The court, mindful of the old
adage, " music bath charms," evidently
felt that the dulcet notes of the attorney
could have only a mollifying and humanizing effect on the jury, and therefore
would operate in favor of the prisoner;
and, if after all this, he was convicted,
the verdict ought to stand. In Martin v.
Mitchell, 28 Ga. 382, one of the jurors
slept one night in the same room with
the attorney of the party who afterwards
obtained a verdict. The room was in a
tavern, and the accommodations not
being of the best, the sheriff slept in the
same bed with the juror. The juror paid
his own expenses, and there was no conversation about the case. A new trial
was refused, upon the ground that there
was nothing to excite suspicion. The
court, in their opinion, remark : "Such
conjunctions are to be regretted and
ought to be carefully scrutinized ;" but
the learned court does not explain whether
the "conjunction" was sleeping in the
same room with the attorney or in the
samd bed with the sheriff.
Ordinary salutations or remarks about
indifferent matters, between parties ad
the jury, are not sufficient grounds for a
new trial; hut communications which
the jury use as a basis for their verdict
are prohibited. In Blalock v. Phillips,
38 Ga. 216, a new trial was granted because one of the jurors, during the trial,
conversed with one not on the jury, in
the presence of others, about the case.
Also, where the jury, during their deliberations, conversed with a witness (State
v. Brarzil, Ga. Dec., 2 Part. 107), where
the foreman, after the jury retired, stated
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to them that the plaintiff in a conversation had satisfied him with regard to a
difficulty: Ritcde v. Holbrooke, 7 S. &
R. (Pa.) 458; and in Knight v. Inhabitants of Freeport, 13 Mass. 218, a new
trial was granted where the son-in-law
of the plaintiff said to a juror, that the
case was of great consequence to him, as
he might have to pay the costs, and the
defence was spiteful. But in White v.
Wood, 8 Cush. 413, a new trial was refused where one of the parties told a
juror, during an adjournment, that he
had been home to get two deeds ; which
were afterwards offered in evidence. A
new trial will not be granted on account
of casual remarks made to the jury after
they are sworn : Burtine v. State, 18
Ga. 534; Epps v. State, 19 Id. 102;
Cohron v. State, 20 Id. 752.
Misconduct of the jury which has not
been injurious to defendant, will not be
ground for a new trial: People v. Hartung, 8 Abb. Pr. 132.
Was the presence of the interpreter
with the jury an improper interference ?
Certainly nothing is such interference
which is essential to the proper discharge
of the jury's sworn duty, to find a verdict according to the evidence. The
last, and by no means the least important
step in the discharge of such duty is the
full and free deliberation of the jury
upon the evidence; and as their deliberation is to be that, not of each man by
himself, but of the twelve together, so
that unanimity may be reached, the interchange of ideas is absolutely essential.
The interpreter is an officer of the
court, sworn to discharge a particular
duty; and there is therefore-the presumption that he will do his duty only.
In all the cases where the verdict has
bhten set aside because of the irregularity
Vo.
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of an officer's conduct, he has either
transgressed the line of his duty or done
something which was unnecessary to its
proper discharge.
The judge discharges his duty when he
instructs the jury upon the law, in open
court; the bailiff is performing his when
he sees that the jury is excluded from
communication with the outside world;
and therefore the presence of either in
the jury room is an irregularity, because
unnecessary ; and the law, in its desire
to have justice impartially administered,
and to avoid even the presumption of any
unfairness, condemns the act. But the
interpreter's presence would seem to be
essential to the complete performance of
the jury's obligation. In no case has an
officer, who has simply performed his
duty, been condemned because he might
have done otherwise. Proof that he did
what he was not required to do, although
no evil consequences have been shown to
follow, has been sufficient, in some cases,
to set aside the verdict. If the interpreter had acted improperly, it could
have been proved by the affidavits of
the jurors; for while they will not be
received to show what the jury did or
said or thought, they will be to show
improper conduct on the part of the
officer. Every reasonable doubt should
be resolved in favor of the prisoner; hut
it is certainly not incumbent on the court
to turn trial by jury into a farce, by
committing the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence to a jury who
cannot understand what each other say
or think, in order to allow him a chance
to escape in the foi through which the
twelve good men and true are floundering.
Wit. H. BUmNET.
Philadelphia.

